KARYN GIL v. JOHN A. GIL, A.C. 28760 AND A.C. 25912, PART III: THE PRETENSE OF A FAIR TRIAL!

I came from a difficult family and so when I was growing up situations often occurred which should not have.  And when they did, I would go to my Mom and say, "But that isn't fair!" and her answer to me often was, "Life isn't fair!"  I always felt outraged by her answer, and to be honest, I still feel that way. 

 

I can't understand society looking at circumstances that are fundamentally unjust and saying "too bad" then looking the other way, rather than taking steps to make things right. In the years that I have lived with being tortured by family court here in CT, I have been shocked by the lack of outrage, the indifference of men and women who should know better to the fundamental tenets of fairness. 

 

Of course, my Mom wasn't trying to change the world, she was just trying to run her household, so she didn't get into many justifications for what she was doing.  In contrast, what is so galling about the court system here in Connecticut is the elaborate, logic twisting, justifications judges write in the form of memoranda of decision to validate and explain away the outright injustice they are committing. 

 

In doing so, these judges make their decisions sound very scholarly by citing various case law, sometimes long strings of case law in a single sentence.  What they don't tell you is that if these judges had drawn a conclusion entirely opposite to the one you were reading they could find a whole string of equally valid seeming decisions supporting that opposite decision. 

 

The whole process of going by case law is a complete farce.  That is the dirty little secret that underlies the entire judicial system.

 

We won't even begin to talk about the cases that ended with completely lawless outcomes which never get mentioned because everyone knows they were formulated to deal with someone who was especially annoying whom the judge wanted to get rid of. 

 

So there is this surface appearance of formal and ordered results that masks complete chaos.  Just to give you some insight into the kind of nonsense that goes on, consider this one conversation I had with an attorney recently.  I mentioned to this attorney that there is no statute in the State of Connecticut which allows the court to deny custody to a parent based upon parental alienation, a point I have heard judges make in court. 

 

In response, the attorney told me that since Connecticut family courts are courts of equity, not just courts of law, judges are allowed to go outside of statutes in order to make their decisions and exercise their "judicial discretion". 

 

That's interesting, when you think of it! 

 

In other words, this attorney is saying that since Connecticut family courts are courts of equity, judges can pretty much do what they want, concepts of due process be damned. 

 

Perhaps this explains how Judge Herbert Gruendel found it possible to rule against Karyn Gil without according her a fair trial.  Thus, on April 5, 2004, Judge Gruendel ruled that Ms. Gil was in contempt of court and that she had committed parental alienation against her ex husband without allowing her to mount a defense. 


The court's decision to make its ruling on that particular day was not accidental.  April 5 is Karyn Gil's birthday.  I could write an entire blog on the family court's manipulative use of birthdays and holidays to conduct devastating court hearings, or release harmful decisions or  family relations evaluations.  So I have no doubt that Judge Gruendel deliberately chose Karyn's birthday to release his decision in the case as a means to demoralize and destroy her ability to stand up for herself.  For those who experience this particular kind of abuse, birthdays and holidays are no longer joyous occasions but instead simply trigger agonizing memories of loss and pain.


Family court is known for making these kinds of emotional guerrilla attacks against its victims, because it wants to crush them to the point where they will not take notice of the major constitutional violations the court has imposed upon them.


For example, in the Gil case, Karyn Gill was not allowed to defend herself.  What happened is that, after allowing her ex husband to present the details of his complaint, the court did not allow Karyn to present her evidence or expert testimony.  Instead, as soon as her ex husband finished his side of the case, Judge Gruendel stated he had heard enough and went ahead and made the ruling against her. 

 

This is what the law states about the question of due process, and I am quoting the Appellate court decision on this case, "A fundamental premise of due process is that a court cannot adjudicate any matter unless the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues involved...Generally, when the exercise of the court's discretion depends on issues of fact which are disputed, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses...it is a fundamental tenet of due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteen amendment to the United States constitution and article first, Sec. 10, of the Connecticut constitution that persons whose...rights will be affected by a court's decision are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner....Where a party is not afforded an opportunity to subject the factual determinations underlying the trial court's decision to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing, an order cannot be sustained."  (Citation omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.  Szot v. Szot, supra, 41 Conn. App. 241-42.) 

 

Of course, here, those of us reading such an extraordinary statement bolstering citizens' rights in family court might start getting really happy, until we read on to the court's next statement which is, "Nothing in Szot, however, suggests that a party's right to present evidence is unlimited."  Eilers v. Eilers 89 Conn. App. 210, 218, 873 A.2d 185 (2005). 

 

And it is in that statement where you begin to see the court's long list of exceptions to our constitutional right to due process.  The one big one which the court cites in the Gil case is that "the plaintiff did not object to the termination of the hearing." 

 

Oh, I see. In other words, the court does not dispute the fact that Karyn Gil's due process rights were trampled on, but simply states that it is ok because she did not object! 

 

So if the court tramples all over your rights and you are so frightened and intimidated that you fail to object, or you have a typical scumbag attorney who is in cahoots with the other side and does not object, then that makes it acceptable to trample over a litigant's constitutional rights.  Of course, as a self-represented party when I have stated my objections to the court, I've been bullied, threatened and subjected to directly personal attacks on my character.  

 

In this regard, what happened to me is that during my trial the judge told me that court rules no longer require that a litigant state his and her objections for the record and since they are no longer required, he was going to forbid me from doing so.  I suspect this was one of those rulings put into place for special people but not considered precedential by attorneys in the know!  Otherwise, I think we're going to have to rewrite all of the Law & Order shows to bring them up to current legal practice. 

 

A second exception to the right to due process is the trial court's freedom to manipulate at will which expert testimony comes before the court and which does not. 

 

For instance, in Karyn Gil's case, Judge Herbert Gruendel was willing to accept the expert testimony and medical records prepared by Dr. Nancy Eisworth, Jane's psychologist from four years prior to trial, but he was unwilling to accept into evidence the expert testimony and medical records from Jane's current psychologist, Dr. Laura Ginther. 

 

Ordinarily, mental health information over a year old is not allowed into evidence because it is considered stale.  O'Neill v. O'Neill, 13 Conn. App. 300, 303, 536 A.2d 978, certification denied, 207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988).  Again, we could get excited by how empowering the O'Neil decision is, particularly since it takes into account that a psychological evaluation is only relevant to the timeframe in which it is produced, and hardly has relevance four years later.  However, as usual, with family court there are always loopholes when a family court judge feels like exercising them. 

 

Like I said, in the law, for whatever direction a judge wants to go in when it comes to his or her decisions, there is always a large catalogue of case law to draw upon which provides you with sufficient case law to go and make any kind of decision you want to make. 

 

So despite, O'Neil there is Yontef v. Yontef and Blake v. Blake which allows the judge to do what he dang well pleases with old medical records.  There you go with a Judge having the right to exercise his judicial discretion no matter what. 

 

When Judge Herbert Gruendel ruled that he was going to bar testimony and medical records from Jane's current therapist, Dr. Laura Ginther, the court cited Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 52-146c (b) in regard to psychologist-patient privilege.  This is a good law that protects patients' rights to confidentiality.  However, I can't tell you how many family court cases I've observed where judges have simply denied litigants those protections and forced their therapists to disclose confidential medical records and provide testimony in open court court regarding their clients, or at least threatened to, or else allowed opposing attorneys to  do so, and get information simply by threatening. 

 

So, as I say, the court is all about doing what it wants, when it wants, how it wants, disregarding the law, or making the law up as it goes along. 

 

The bottom line is, if the court wants the truth to come out in a case such as Gil v. Gil, why prevent a perfectly solid, current witness from going on the stand?  There are questions any attorney can ask a child's psychologist without causing any harm to that child's treatment or confidentiality.  One I can think of which would be quite pertinent and relevant to this case, for instance, and not at all harmful to the child is as follows, "Do you think that Karyn Gil has been parentally alienating  her child from John Gil?"  A quick "yes" or "no" would do and still protect the rights of the child.  Of course, this genius level question only emerged six months later after this particular show trial was over when Jane was driven to the point of suicide by additional abuse from her father.  Then, and only then, did Judge Gruendel himself finally allow Dr.  Laura Ginther to go to the stand and provide the testimony she'd had all along that Karyn Gil had not committed PAS. 

 

So who was against such testimony?  Who blocked it?  Who barred it?  Who prevented the truth from coming out and instead continued to allow Mr. John Gil to subject Karyn Gil and her daughter to ongoing legal abuse? 

 

The answer to that question is, the Guardian Ad Litem first of all--well, yes, the judge who went along with it, but primarily it was the Guardian Ad Litem who was supposed to be acting in the best interests of the child, but chose not to:  Attorney Campbell Barrett of Budlong and Barrett, LLC -- that is the man responsible for this travesty, this monstrous breakdown in the right to due process.


RELATED ARTICLES:


Gil. v. Gil, Part I:
http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2014/12/karyn-gil-v-john-gil-ac-ac-28760-and-ac.html


Gil v. Gil, Part II:
http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2014/12/karyn-gil-v-john-gil-ac-28760-and-ac.html


Gil v. Gil, Part IV:
http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2014/12/karyn-gil-v-john-gil-ac-28760-and-ac_28.html