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Showing posts with label DISABILITY RIGHTS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DISABILITY RIGHTS. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 31, 2015

THE HARTFORD COURANT REPORTS THAT A NEW TRIAL ORDERED IN LAPOINTE MURDER CASE, EXPLOITATION OF MENTAL DISABILITY CITED!

The Hartford Courant reports as follows:

"A divided state Supreme Court on Tuesday ordered a new trial in the controversial murder case against Richard Lapointe, concluding that the mentally disabled dishwasher was denied evidence supporting his innocence when he was tried and convicted a quarter century ago for the rape and murder of his then-wife's 88-year old grandmother.

The 4-2 decision, written for the majority by Justice Richard N. Palmer, is certain to renew calls for the now 69-year old Lapointe's release. He has been imprisoned continuously since his conviction for rape, capital murder and other crimes in 1992. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

Lapointe is accused of stabbing Bernice Martin 11 times and setting her Manchester apartment on fire to cover the crime. The case has become notorious because of the interrogations by the Manchester police of Lapointe and his now ex-wife, who also is disabled..."

For more information on the case, please click on the link below:


http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-lapointe-new-trial-ordered-0402-20150331-story.html

Thursday, March 26, 2015

CT LAW TRIBUNE REPORTS ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL CITED FOR FAILING TO ACCOMMODATE A HEARING IMPAIRED PATIENT!

A Hartford area hospital and the federal government have settled a dispute after a hearing-impaired patient reported that the hospital wasn't providing the necessary services to ensure adequate communication between the patient and staff.

St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center has agreed to take steps toward improving communications for the deaf and hard of hearing. Additionally, the hospital has agreed to pay the patient $45,000.


The matter was initiated by a complaint filed with the U.S. Justice Department alleging violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Specifically, the patient alleged that St. Francis failed to provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to ensure effective communication during multiple admissions to the hospital. Sign language was the main form of communication for the man.


Read more:

Saturday, March 21, 2015

UPCOMING ADA COMMITTEE MEETING, MARCH 25, 2015!



Advisory Board on the Americans with Disabilities Act

Wednesday, March 25

10 a.m.

Community Court, 80 Washington Street Hartford, CT 

For a copy of the agenda to this meeting, see below:

Tuesday, March 17, 2015

ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORTS CASSANDRA C. -- READY TO GO HOME!

The Associated Press reports as follows:

"HARTFORD, Conn. (AP) — A 17-year-old girl who was forced to undergo chemotherapy testified Monday at a closed door hearing where she and her mother are seeking her release from state custody.

The teen, identified only as Cassandra C., testified by teleconference in Juvenile Court, according to attorneys.

The teen learned recently that her cancer is in remission and she is no longer fighting the treatment. But she and her mother are asking to end her custody by the Department of Children and Families so she can go home now instead of waiting until the chemotherapy is complete next month..."

For more on this article, please click on the link below:




http://news.yahoo.com/teen-forced-undergo-chemo-testifies-custody-hearing-194720568.html

Tuesday, March 10, 2015

BILL MULREADY DEMANDS ACTION FROM THE CONNECTICUT DOJ ON ADA VIOLATIONS IN THE CT JUDICIAL BRANCH!

Dear Attorney Hughes and Attorney Deirdre Daly:

Is it our turn yet?  May we expect individual interviews in short order as a follow through on the announcement of last year, January 8, 2014 that your offices were conducting an investigation into the compliance of the CT Judicial Branch with federal ADA law?  May we expect affirmative actions similar to these provided by your brothers, sisters and cousins at the DOJ and HHS in Massachusetts?  Can we get equal and the same treatment here in Connecticut from you, Attorney Perkins and Attorney Daly?  Many CT citizens with disabilities have contacted the Civil Rights Division of the CT DOJ in response to your announcement of an investigation, and yet there seems to be no action on your part. 

Mr. Hughes, on January 8, 2014 you provided a letter of hope to Elizabeth and Susan and indeed all the disabled subjected to programs, services and activities of Connecticut public entities, in particular the Connecticut Judicial Branch and Department of Children and Families.  Since that time you 3 have received unlimited numbers of verifiable ADA and 504 violations, past, present, future, regarding on going non compliance, exclusions from participation, denials of benefits from CT Judicial Branch and DCF programs services and activities, and you have had testimony regarding how CT citizens have been subjected to ongoing discrimination by reason of disabilities and >90% of the time the issue is related to gender. 

We turn to you 3, Attorneys Daily, Perkins and Hughes for redress from these civil rights and disability rights violations.

The Gordon's in Massachusetts got many personal interviews and it looks like on going updates and "transparency"! 

We here in  Connecticut see delays and what looks to be even guidance and collusion in connection to the CT Judicial Branch and DCF to promote a smoke screen and railroading of citizens as well as a general cover up of ADA violations.  We are seeing the CT Department of Justice allow the CT Judicial Branch to avoid meeting the requirements of federal ADA law by allowing them to use the deceptive phrase that they are cooperating with " continuing compliance" rather than immediately obeying in full which they have had sufficient time to do.
 
It is not acceptable that the JB and DCF at first ignores, denies, provides misleading and confusing findings and rulings in response to person's inquires, complaints, requests, begging, comments, suggestions, arguments and then at a later time the Judicial Branch or DCF pronounces their provision of such as part of their "continued compliance.
 
We are onto this and ask why are your offices at the DOJ allowing it?  We ask where was compliance on our individual cases, each and every one?  Where are our remedies for past disabilities discrimination?  Where is the elimination of current disabilities discrimination, and prohibitions against future disabilities discrimination, including today?
 
I write the above alone at this time Mr. Hughes. I write for my self first and in support of ALL my earlier and probably most if not ALL of my writings.  But I write also for all other persons subjected to disability and gender and any discrimination by the Judicial Branch or DCF.  How many are here in Connecticut? 18% of 3,000,000 Connecticut citizens at a minimum amounts to 540,000? Plus, friends and family associated with persons with disabilities amounts to another 540,000 minimum at 1 to 1 which adds up to about 1,800,000?  Of course, there are many more as all of the United States and indeed the World expect "comprehensive ADA compliance". 
 
Please respond with information on the steps you intend to take to remedy this disgraceful situation which I have described.
 
Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.
 
Yours For Barrier Free Courts With Sober And Honest Judges And None Discriminating Attorneys And State Actors And State Contractors,
Bill Mulready

Additional Endorsements For This Letter From:

Susan Skipp Tittle
Next friend and parent of G.A.T., 14 and W.G.T., 12
Elizabeth A. Richter,
Parent of M.R.R. and P.U.R.

Monday, March 9, 2015

IMPORTANT BILL ON SUPERVISED VISITATION, GALS , AND COURT ORDERED MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT UP FOR CONSIDERATION THIS WEEK BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE!

There will be a public hearing before the Judiciary Committee on Wednesday, March 11, 2015 at 10:30 a.m., at the LOB in room 2E, in regard to Committee Bill No. 5505:  An Act Concerning Family Court Proceedings.  Please make time to present your testimony in support of this bill.  The language of this bill includes important safeguards against:

1.  GAL Abuse
2.  The frivolous imposition of unnecessary supervised visitation
3.  Forced mental health treatment for yourself and your child
 
The wording of the bill is as follows:

 
AN ACT CONCERNING FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2015) Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 815, 815a, 815e, 815j, 815p, 815t or 815y of the general statutes, a court shall not order that a parent have supervised visitation with his or her child, unless such court finds, based upon the evidence presented to the court, that such parent: (1) Has engaged in an act of neglect or abuse that has been substantiated by the Department of Children and Families; (2) has no established relationship with the child with whom visitation is sought; (3) has engaged in criminal conduct that presents a potential risk to the health, safety or well-being of a child; or (4) suffers from a severe mental disability that presents a potential risk to the health, safety or well-being of a child.

Sec. 2. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2015) A person aggrieved by the action of counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child or children, appointed under section 46b-54 of the general statutes, as amended by this act, may bring a civil action seeking appropriate relief, including equitable relief, damages, or both, in the superior court for the judicial district in which such counsel or guardian ad litem for a minor child was appointed. If such civil action results in a judgment for the plaintiff, the court shall award the plaintiff all costs of the action, including such attorney's fees as the court may allow to the plaintiff. The court shall not enter any order under this section that would require a plaintiff to pay the costs, expenses or attorney's fees of counsel or a guardian ad litem for a minor child named as a defendant in such civil action. It shall not be a defense to such civil action that the defendant is entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity.

Sec. 3. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2015) (a) In a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1 of the general statutes, if a court orders that a parent undergo treatment or an evaluation from a licensed health care provider, as defined in section 52-184e of the general statutes, the court shall allow the parent to select the licensed health care provider who is to provide such treatment or evaluation.
(b) In a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1 of the general statutes, if a court orders that a child undergo treatment or an evaluation from a licensed health care provider, as defined in section 52-184e of the general statutes, the court shall permit the parent or legal guardian of such child to select the licensed health care provider who is to provide such treatment or evaluation. If two parents do not agree on the selection of a licensed health care provider to provide such treatment or evaluation to a child, the court shall continue the matter for two weeks to allow the parents an opportunity to jointly select the licensed health care provider. If after the two-week period, the parents have not reached an agreement on the selection of a licensed health care provider, the court shall select such provider after giving due consideration to the health insurance coverage and financial resources available to such parents. In the case of two parents who cannot agree on the selection of a licensed health care provider to provide such treatment or evaluation to the child, if a parent incurs expenses as a result of permitting the child to be treated or evaluated by such provider, without the express written consent of the other parent, the parent who permitted such treatment or evaluation to occur shall be solely responsible for the costs incurred for such treatment or evaluation.
(c) In a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1 of the general statutes, if a court orders that a parent or child undergo an evaluation from a licensed health care provider, as defined in section 52-184e of the general statutes, the results of such evaluation shall be submitted to the court by such provider not later than thirty days after the date of completion of the evaluation.

Sec. 4. Subsection (e) of section 46b-54 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2015):
(e) [Counsel] Except as provided in this subsection, counsel or a guardian ad litem for the minor child or children shall be heard on all matters pertaining to the interests of any child, including the custody, care, support, education and visitation of the child, so long as the court deems such representation to be in the best interests of the child. To the extent practicable, when hearing from such counsel or guardian ad litem, the court shall permit such counsel or guardian ad litem to participate at the beginning of the matter, at the conclusion of the matter or at such other time the court deems appropriate so as to minimize legal fees incurred by the parties due to the participation of such counsel or guardian ad litem in the matter. Such counsel or guardian ad litem [may] shall not be heard on a matter pertaining to a medical diagnosis or conclusion concerning a minor child made by a health care professional treating such child. [when (1) such counsel or guardian ad litem is in possession of a medical record or report of the treating health care professional that indicates or supports such medical diagnosis or conclusion; or (2) one or more parties have refused to cooperate in paying for or obtaining a medical record or report that contains the treating health care professional's medical diagnosis or conclusion. If] Instead, if the court deems it to be in the best interests of the minor child, such health care professional shall be heard on matters pertaining to the interests of any such child, including the custody, care, support, education and visitation of such child. 

ANATOMY OF A CUSTODY SWITCHING SCHEME: THE KATHI SORRENTINO STORY, PART V!

For six years subsequent to the Sorrentino divorce, Mr. Sorrentino didn't have overnights with his son, Storm.  Then just before the father filed his motion for contempt which initiated this custody switching scheme, he began to demand overnights for the first time in six years.  All of a sudden, the fact that he'd been denied overnights became the basis for accusations of parental alienation, even though Mr. Sorrentino had been in agreement with not having overnights right up to that point.  

Of course, I can understand why anyone would find a situation like this puzzling.  Why didn't Mr. Sorrentino have overnights with his child? 

My first thought was that ordinarily you wouldn't have overnights in a situation where there is domestic violence. But this was actually not the reason since our Family Courts here in Connecticut rarely acknowledge how serious domestic violence is and rarely act to protect the victims in these cases.

The actual explanation is as follows: After the divorce,  both Mr. and Mrs. Sorrentino scheduled overnights in their parenting agreement of 2007.  However, just in the natural course of events, they eventually changed their agreement in 2010 because they both came to the conclusion that it would be better for their son, Storm, not to have overnights. 

One primary reason for this was that Mr. Sorrentino didn't have a stable living situation he could bring his son to for an overnight.  Apparently, Mr. Sorrentino rented out his house, and often stayed in a home where he was house sitting.  At other times, he was living in a boarding house, or else he stayed with his girlfriend. 

As the parties' former co-parenting counselor, Jennifer Champagne, stated, "At that point in time, Mr. Sorrentino was residing in a boarding house.  And the discussion at the time was that while, again, he was interested in having time with his son, that the accommodations were making it a little challenging at that precise moment."  For instance, there was "no designated space for a bedroom at that time." 

The bottom line is that if you cannot maintain a home for your child, you can hardly complain that you are not having overnights. 

Another issue that stood in the way of overnights was Storm's disability, which father was very well aware of.  As the co-parent counselor reported in her testimony to the Court, Sam Sorrentino fully understood that Storm was not able to manage overnights stating,  "Mr. Sorrentino described [his son] as a homebody.  And it was my understanding that he [Storm] was anxious." 

The end result of the mutual understanding that both Kathi Sorrentino and Sam Sorrentino had regarding their son's anxiety was that they signed a new agreement in 2010 eliminating the overnights but continuing regular father/son contact every weekend.  This was the agreement that was in place until May 2013 when Sam Sorrentino filed a motion for contempt and acted as though the 2010 agreement didn't exist.  Then Judge Klatt manipulated the flow of information during the legal proceedings so that the very existence of the 2010 agreement never made it onto the record so she was not obligated to consider it when she made her decision regarding switching custody.  

So what does this mean that Storm was anxious?  According to Storm's school psychologist and education advocate, Rena Schine, Storm was diagnosed in 2009 by a psychiatrist as having a serious anxiety disorder.  There are more official terms for his condition, but in order to protect his privacy, I will leave it at that.  In essence, the letter stated, Storm has "trust issues, fear of staying overnight anywhere, and a need for predictability and stability."   

Rena Schine further stated, "It can be understood that Storm would be hesitant to stay overnight with his father who, since 2007, has not had stable living arrangements but rather rents out his home and lives in different houses in which strangers come and go."  She then continued on to state, "Storm has anxiety when anticipating having to have an "overnight"... otherwise he is not "alienated" from his father.  He just doesn't want to stay overnight." 

And further, "...teachers have expressed concerns over the years that reflect Storm's natural tendency to be reticent and sensitive to any kind of stress.  Anxiety has been a constant theme expressed by teachers" in regard to Storm.  

Overall, as Rena Schine's testimony confirmed and as Kathi Sorrentino also stated repeatedly in Court, Storm wasn't just reluctant to have overnights with his Dad, he was reluctant to have overnights anywhere, not even with friends.  In fact, Kathi talked about one situation where she'd agreed to have Storm stay overnight with a friend and she had to go pick him up late at night and take him home because he was so uncomfortable. 

Here is a condition that Mr. and Mrs. Sorrentino both have seen and agree exists as witnessed by their co-parent counselor, a condition that has been diagnosed by a psychiatrist, and confirmed by two mental health counselors.  It is a condition that the parties have recognized and accommodated together for six years, and now, all of a sudden father declares that it doesn't exist, that the lack of overnights are alienating him as father, and that the only reason he's agreed to it is that he was bullied by his ex wife and didn't want to make waves. 

Oh, really? 

So how do you eliminate a child's mental health diagnosis from the picture? 

Well, if you are Dr. Eric Frazer, you simply lie about it. 

When Dr. Eric Frazer took the stand to provide his testimony, he stated in outright contradiction of the facts that Storm's anxiety disorder didn't exist any more, and had not been in evidence since elementary school.  In his words, "Your Honor, may I please be heard, to hopefully enlighten the Court just on a few specifics?  So this is based on my conversation with Roger Stebbins, who is the guidance counselor for Storm at the present time.  And Mr. Stebbins informed me that the last time that there was a 504 accommodation [for Storm's anxiety] was in 3rd grade." 

He continued on in this line, "And this was brought to the attention [of the school] in 3rd grade.  It has since been successfully resolved, and Storm is functioning appropriate [ly] academically and socially in school.  And he does not have any special accommodations at the present time pertaining to any special learning needs or behavioral health needs." 

Kathi Sorrentino herself tried to correct this misrepresentation by stating to the Court, "Storm had 504 meetings not just...in 3rd grade.  He had them up to last year."  In addition, in the light of these misrepresentations, Kathi Sorrentino asked permission to put Storm's education advocate, Rena Schine, on the stand to obtain clarification of what was actually going on. 

When asked how old Storm was when he first obtained accommodations for his learning disability of anxiety, this advocate responded by saying "Well, just roughly I'd say about 3rd grade."  When asked when those services ended she stated, "I went to meetings up through middle school..[which is] 6th, 7th, or 8th grade." 

Nonetheless, despite the testimony from two people--Kathi Sorrentino and Rena Schine--Judge Corinne Klatt went along with Dr. Frazer's outright lie, and refused to acknowledge the advocate's testimony stating, "I know you are arguing that he has anxiety, I know that I have not heard any professional opinion that he has anxiety, and I will not allow this witness [the education advocate] to render any kind of opinion on that because she does not have the experience at present, nor does she have the involvement in the case.  In other words, she doesn't know enough about the facts of this case to issue that type of diagnosis." 

However, Judge Klatt's remarks make absolutely no common sense. The bottom line is, the fact that you have been granted a 504 accommodation is evidence enough for the disability.  It's like an American Passport is sufficient evidence that you are an American citizen even if you can't produce your naturalization certificate, or birth certificate, because you can't get the one without the other.

Plus, might I just add that Judge Corinne Klatt has had no problem freely speculating in regard to Kathi Sorrentino's mental health condition without benefit of any valid psychiatric testimony whatsoever.  So I am not sure why she would have a problem with it now.  Basically, it appears as though Judge Klatt only wants to admit testimony that will go along with this pre-set custody switching scheme.

In short, as far as Judge Klatt was concerned, Rena Schine, the advocate, had participated in 504 meetings regarding Storm in 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th grade, and yet she wasn't considered qualified enough to reveal the exact diagnosis Storm had for which she was providing advocacy? 

Well, if you say so!  But it should be clear to the Court that even if you don't put a specific label on a diagnosis, the mere fact that you have made the statement that you have one should be sufficient to trigger immediate legal mandates that the unnamed disability receive proper accommodations.

In the final moments of Dr. Eric Frazer's testimony in regard to Storm's diagnosis, Kathi Sorrentino asked why Dr. Frazer didn't believe in the existence of Storm's diagnosis and his answer was solely, "there is no rational explanation for it."  Wow, so a mental health diagnosis can only exist if there is a rational explanation for it?  I am sure that the American Psychiatric Association would find that assessment quite interesting if not outright incorrect. 

Title II of Federal ADA Law, which the Court is required to follow, as are all present attorneys, prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities and protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all state and local governments.  It adopts the general prohibitions against discrimination established under section 504, as well as the requirements for making programs accessible to individuals with disabilities  and for providing equally effective communications to those with disabilities.

The Connecticut Judicial Branch is a public entity under Title II of the ADA.  Title II of the ADA, which applies to public entities, requires that such an entity provide "reasonable modifications" in policies, practices or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of a disability unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or activity.  The public entity has the burden of proof with regard to fundamental alteration.  See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 35.130(b)(7).

When Dr. Eric Frazer lied about Storm Sorrentino's disability and attempted to suppress all evidence of its existence, he was directly discriminating against Storm in violation of Title II of Federal ADA law and showing deliberate indifference to the consequences of covering up the evidence of that disability.  The same can be said of Judge Corinne Klatt and also of Attorney Kevin Finch, attorney for the father, who was well aware that Storm Sorrentino has a disability.  Further, the Court is in violation of Storm's rights under Title II of the ADA because he had the right to equal access to the legal proceedings which was denied by the discrimination against him perpetrated by the GAL.  This is an issue which should be addressed immediately.

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

DEMONSTRATION OF CART TECHNOLOGY FOR DEAF, HARD OF HEARING, AND OTHER INVISIBLE DISABILITIES IN THE COURTROOM!

Ordinarily, the words would not be projected on a large screen. Instead, you would be able to read them on a laptop at your desk. Just FYI!

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

THE HARTFORD COURANT REPORTS CT USES EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINTS WITH SCHOOL CHILDREN!

The Hartford Courant reports as follows:
 
"A 4-year-old boy identified with a developmental delay was physically restrained by school staff after he "threw (puzzle) pieces on the floor and across the room" while playing with a puzzle on a classroom rug.
 
An elementary school student was put into seclusion after "swinging her coat at staff."
 
These are among hundreds of incidents — deemed "emergencies" by school personnel — that warranted restraining and isolating preschool and elementary school students in Connecticut last year. A new report by the state Office of the Child Advocate raises "significant concern" regarding the frequency with which young children with autism and other disabilities are restrained or secluded; lapses in documentation or actual compliance with state laws; and the prevalence of "unidentified and unmet educational needs for children subject to forceful or isolative measures."
 
For more information regarding this article, please click on the link below:
 

Sunday, February 15, 2015

THE CT MIRROR REPORTS A REGRETABLE RESIGNATION: PATRICIAL REHMER TO STEP DOWN AS DHMAS HEAD!

According to Arielle Levin Becker of The CT Mirror,

"Patricia Rehmer, the state’s commissioner of mental health and addiction services, is stepping down for a “new opportunity” outside state government, a source said Sunday.

Details on Rehmer’s departure were not immediately clear. She was not available for comment Sunday.

Gov. Dannel P. Malloy reappointed Rehmer in December, and she went through a legislative confirmation hearing earlier this month.

Rehmer has led the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services since 2009. She has drawn praise from legislators, mental health advocates, and treatment providers, who cite her advocacy for people the agency serves and efforts to preserve services in spite of tight budgets."

For more information on this topic, please click on the link below:



Wednesday, January 28, 2015

HUMAN RIGHTS WITH TINA MINKOWITZ!

Join us for a discussion on the United Nations perspective on forced and coercive psychiatric treatment.

January 29, 2015
1:00 - 4:00 p.m.
CT Women's Consortium
2321 Whitney Avenue, Suite 401
Hamden, CT  06518
 
or
 
January 30, 2015
10:00 - 1:00 p.m.
Toivo
399 Franklin Ave.
Hartford, CT  06114

FREE EVENT BROUGHT TO YOU BY
ADVOCACY UNLIMITED!

Tina Minkowitz is president and founder of the Center for the Human Rights of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry.  She is a lawyer as well as a survivor activist and represented the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry in the drafting and negotiation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities (CRPD).  Ms. Minkowitz is internationally recognized as an expert on the CRPD and is credited with some of its most far-reaching provisions along with others who working together made it all possible.

RSVP via email to:
lientini@mindlink.org
adeonarine@mindlink.org

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

ELIZABETH A. RICHTER'S FEDERAL ADA COMPLAINT CONTINUES ON TO APPEAL AT THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT!

In the Fall of 2012, Elizabeth A. Richter filed a Federal ADA Complaint with the Connecticut District Court stating that she had been repeatedly denied accommodations for her disability and faced disability   based discrimination during her divorce case which took place in Hartford Superior Court and the State's Appellate Court from 2006 until 2012.  Ms. Richter's Federal Complaint was dismissed in March 2014 and has now been appealed to the Second Circuit Court in New York City.
 
Elizabeth Richter's original Federal Complaint was filed against the following Defendants: The Connecticut Judicial Branch, an attorney firm O'Connell, Attmore & Morris, LLC, and also an individual judge, Herbert Barall, the same judge who presided over the Linda Wiegand case. 
 
Ms. Richter brought the action in Federal Court to obtain redress for these Defendants' violations of Title II and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and as Amended in 2008.  The Americans With Disabilities Act is a civil rights law which is intended to enfranchise the many millions of Americans who have disabilities throughout the United States.  Further, Ms. Richter also brought the action based upon Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, an early version of the ADA, and also based upon the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States constitution. 
 
As a result of the violations of due process and her right of access to state court legal proceedings, the Plaintiff, Elizabeth A. Richter requested that the Federal District court provide her with declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees.  She also requested the reversal of her state court judgments as well as monetary compensation for the intentional infliction of emotional distress which she endured as a result of the Defendants' actions.
 
Elizabeth Richter's struggles with discrimination began  over 30 years ago when Ms. Richter was misdiagnosed as having a severe mental illness she did not have and locked up in a psychiatric facility for a little more than two years.  Ms. Richter spoke of this incident before the Task Force on the Care and Custody of Minor Children which took place last year.  See the link below:
 
 
Despite the fact that this hospitalization was mistake, throughout her divorce the opposing side in the case repeatedly brought the subject up as the basis for denying Elizabeth Richter custody.  The opposing attorney in her case also repeatedly attempted to have Ms. Richter declared incompetent and to have a Guardian Ad Litem appointed to make decisions on behalf of Ms. Richter. 
 
Elizabeth Richter also brought up the fact that she experiences so much discrimination and stigma as a result of that incident that, over the years, she has had to have counseling for the stress and anxiety it has caused her. 
 
Despite this extensive history which qualified the Plaintiff for protections under Title II of the ADA, the Superior Court at Hartford where Ms. Richter's case was adjudicated, refused to acknowledge that she was a qualified individual under the ADA and refused to provide her with any reasonable modifications during the entire six years that her case was going through the Court. 
 
Elizabeth Richter also pointed out in her Complaint that the Connecticut Judicial Branch subjected her to a systemic pattern of discrimination and the denial of her ADA rights such that she was unable to obtain testamentary and participatory access to justice throughout her divorce.  Most particularly, the Connecticut Judicial Branch hid documents Elizabeth Richter had provided to the Court which showed evidence of her disability and explained what accommodations were necessary for her.   
 
Furthermore, Ms. Richter reported that she experienced discrimination from her own attorneys who failed to provide her with adequate representation and made statements regarding her which were intended to incite a bigoted response from the Court.  In particular, her attorney, Attorney James T. Flaherty, who was named in the lawsuit, failed to inform her of her rights under Title III of the ADA, failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations so that she could access the attorney firm's legal services, and also discriminated against her based upon her disability, and also based upon the firm's false perceptions of the disability they thought she had.  The attorney firm also refused to protect her from discrimination based upon the false perceptions that arose from the misdiagnosis she received over 30 years ago.  
 
During her post-judgment matters in her divorce, Elizabeth Richter complained that Judge Herbert Barall refused to provide her with reasonable accommodations, discriminated against her based upon the perception of disability, and interfered with her ADA advocate when he tried to do his job.  She also complained that Judge Barall used derogatory language while referring to her two children who have a disability and refused to acknowledge that they are legally blind although this fact was well documented and he was fully informed of their disability. 
 
In addition, in her Complaint, Elizabeth Richter brought to the attention of the Federal Court the fact that the Connecticut Judicial Branch does not have a publically identified ADA Coordinator as required by ADA law according to II-8.5000 of the Title II Technical Assistance manual.  Further, it has provided confusing and misleading responses when asked to identify one.  Also, the Judicial Branch does not have a meaningful grievance procedure. 
 
Finally, Elizabeth Richter complained that the Connecticut Judicial Branch has been restricting ADA law to Title I of the ADA, instead of Title II as required by federal law, in an attempt to avoid providing the broader based and more encompassing modifications it is required to provide under Title II. 
 
It is also important to note that since Ms. Richter filed her lawsuit in federal court, the Connecticut Judicial Branch has subjected her to interference and harassment in her role as an ADA Advocate in support of litigants with disabilities.  This is also a violation of ADA law.  
 
Ms. Richter's initial filing of her complaint was in November 2012 and then she Amended her complaint in April 2013.  Despite that, the decision of the Federal Court  dismissing her case was issued a full year later at the end of March 2014.  Apparently, according to Ms. Richter, this is quite typical of legal proceedings.  As she stated, "The Courts regularly drag out proceedings and delay responding to motions until the very last day because they hope that by doing so litigants will become discouraged and give up.  That way the Court can avoid taking proper action and avoid bearing the consequences for a wrong decision." 
 
And in this particular case, the decision really was wrong. 
 
As Ms. Richter explains it, "What the federal court basically did was declare that I do not have a disability which is just totally ridiculous.  I have been a person with a disability, and have a record of receiving treatment for anxiety over a period of many years, particularly since my misdiagnosis and wrongful hospitalization which ended in 1980.  Furthermore, during the divorce I was diagnosed with acute stress disorder as a result of the legal proceedings as well as legal abuse syndrome.  There is no way that I did not have a disability prior to the legal proceedings as well as during those proceedings.  And I am continuing to take a pounding as I pursue my legal rights in Federal Court." 
 
Ms. Richter continued on to say, "Even if you grant what the Federal Court said that I currently don't have a disability, that isn't even relevant.   Under ADA law it is recognized that a misdiagnosis such as the one I had many years ago still qualifies you as having a disability."  Nonetheless, the federal court decision of March 2014 denies that this is so. 
 
Not only  that, there is more to why the Federal Court made a completely misguided decision in Ms. Richter's case.  Apparently, to be protected by the ADA, one must have a disability, defined by the ADA as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.  Otherwise, a person must have a history or record of such an impairment, or be a person who is perceived by others as having such an impairment. "What the Court did," stated Elizabeth Richter, "was argue that I only had temporary anxiety and it ignored my statement that I'd basically had a 30 year history of anxiety on and off.  It twisted my words around and deliberately misinterpreted them." 
 
Also, the Federal Court essentially argued that a temporary disability is not covered under ADA law.  This is, in fact, untrue.  Many temporary disabilities are covered under ADA law.  Not only that, according to Elizabeth Richter, "The Federal Court simply refused to discuss the second and third categories under which I could have been held to be eligible for ADA protection, i.e. the fact that I had a record of a disability from my earlier psychiatric hospitalization, let alone my subsequent treatment for anxiety, and also my complaint that I was perceived as having a disability I did not have." 
 
"What this really amounts to," stated Ms. Richter, "is the Judicial Nullification of Federal ADA law on the highest level." 
 
This is particularly outrageous granting  the passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.  Essentially, Congress enacted the ADAAA of 2008 because it wanted to stop the mini-trials on whether a person had a disability or not and instead wanted to force attention on the merits of the case.  This means that the Federal Court's extensive focus on whether Elizabeth A. Richter did or did not have an eligible disability was completely in violation of the law. 
 
Furthermore, according to Chai R. Goldblum, a national expert on ADA policy, since the passage of the ADAAA in 2008, "The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not on whether the individual meets the definition of disability."  In its decision in Ms. Richter's case, the Federal Court simply refused to address the fact that The Connecticut Judicial Branch failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations and it failed to consider any of her other complaints.  The Federal Court decision solely focused on whether Ms. Richter had a disability or not, in direct opposition to the spirit of the ADAAA.
 
What is even more ridiculous about the Federal District Court's decision in this case is that finally, after years of stonewalling, on December 7, 2012 a Judge of the State of Connecticut confirmed the fact that Elizabeth Richter has a disability that entitles her to the protections of Federal ADA law.  As Ms. Richter stated, "Given the fact that a State Court judge has already confirmed that [I have] a disability based upon the same information that District Court has before it, how can the District Court then contradict that decision?" 
 
This is not the first time that the Connecticut District Court has ruled that an individual everyone knows has a disability does not have a disability.  For instance, in a recent decision in Andrew Adams v. Fun Festival Parks (Lake Compounce), the Court ruled that Mr. Adams was not disabled despite the fact that he'd been developmentally disabled since birth and in special programs throughout his public school education.  In making its determination the Connecticut District Court cited exclusively pre-ADAAA of 2008 case law to justify its decision.  This is exactly the same thing it did in the Richter case. 

Even more troubling is the remark Elizabeth Richter made about the decision in her case in Connecticut District Court when it came out.  She stated, "I am not even sure that a Judge wrote this decision.  It shows such a profound lack of insight into Federal ADA law, it doesn't seem possible that a Judge wrote it.  My guess is that the Judge had her clerk write it and then just signed off on it with just a cursory glance.  That is a pretty outrageous way for our Federal Courts to be operating.  Of course, I have no proof, but that is the way the decision looks and reads."
 
In ruling as it did in complete violation of Federal ADA law in these two cases, the Connecticut District Court has essentially signaled to CT State Government and its Agencies as well as to businesses throughout Connecticut that they are free to violate Federal ADA law. 
 
People with disabilities better watch out, because it is open season on eliminating their human rights, their civil rights, and their constitutional rights. 
 
Still, Elizabeth Richter has not allowed her complaint to end there.  She has continued on with an appeal to the Second Circuit Court where she just submitted her final brief.  We will eagerly await the results of that appeal.

Friday, January 23, 2015

INTRODUCED BY SEN. MICHAEL MCLACHLAN, PROPOSED BILL NO. 660, TO ESTABLISH A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CONSERVATORS!

General Assembly
  Proposed Bill No. 660  
January Session, 2015
  LCO No. 2327
  *02327*

Referred to Committee on JUDICIARY
 
Introduced by: 

SEN. MCLACHLAN, 24th Dist.
 

AN ACT CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROFESSIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CONSERVATORS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

That chapter 801 of the general statutes be amended to require the Probate Court Administrator to develop and implement a professional code of conduct applicable to any conservator appointed in a Probate Court matter.

Statement of Purpose:
To require the Probate Court Administrator to develop and implement a professional code of conduct for conservators appointed in Probate Court matters.

Sunday, January 4, 2015

DIVORCE IN CONNECTICUT: COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ON AUDIORECORDINGS!

For those of you interested in the question of the access to audiorecordings of legal proceedings at the CT Judicial Branch, the following is a group of interesting articles on the subject:

Commentary on Audiorecordings by "Anonymous"!http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2015/01/commentary-on-how-judicial-branch-scams.html
 
 
Editorial Supporting the Public's Access to Audiorecordings
http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2015/01/why-issue-of-audiorecordings-should.html

Part II of a Research Report on the Issue of Audiorecordings
http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2015/01/part-ii-case-study-on-ct-judicial.html

Part I of a Research Report on the Issue of Audiorecordings
http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2015/01/part-i-case-study-on-ct-judicial-lack.html

Review of the CT Judicial Branch Audiorecording Subcommittee Report
http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2014/09/judicial-restrictions-on-access-to.html

PART II: CASE STUDY ON THE CT JUDICIAL BRANCH'S LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ADA LAW!

By Elizabeth A. Richter

DATA CONTINUED

As I previously mentioned, I had been speaking by email to Attorney Maureen Finn, the spokesperson for the CT Judicial Branch in regard to the ADA, attempting to find out how a person with a disability could obtain the reasonable modification of audiorecordings for his or her disability.  I had asked, "Would there ever be a reasonable basis for turning down such a request?"  On September 9, 2014, her response had been, "I prefer not to speculate about possibilities."


Of course, this is not so much about "possibilities" so much as it is a question of what I can say as an ADA advocate to a person with a disability who is trying to establish what reasonable modifications he or she is entitled to.  Simply put, I would like to be able to say with some measure of clarity that "yes" audiorecordings are available or "no" they are not!


Naturally, this was all very discouraging to me and so I shut down for a few days and spent some time on researching the subject of audiorecordings on the internet.  I am the kind of person who has been trained to advocate and to ask questions, so no matter what barriers I face, I am likely to return with further questions as needed.  However, what about some of the others who are members of this vulnerable population of individuals with disabilities.  Many of these folks do not have the ability to deal with the kind of obstruction that the Judicial Branch gets up to, particularly the use of bureaucratic double talk which prevents people from figuring out what their rights are.


After gathering together my emotional resources, on September 15, 2014, I sent out another email to Attorney Maureen Finn where I stated, "I think it is reasonable to request information from the Judicial Branch regarding what criteria an individual would have to meet in regard to a disability in order to qualify for the reasonable modification of the use of audiorecordings."



I further stated, "Without specific standards from the CT Judicial Branch regarding what would be a legitimate basis for a request for audiorecordings and what would not be a legitimate basis...,a litigant with a disability is really placed in a the very difficult position of guessing or being forced him or herself to speculate regarding the possibilities since you refuse to provide specific guidelines."


I then ended with the request, "Could you please provide me with a clear and understandable response to my question."


In response, one week later on September 22, 2014, Attorney Maureen Finn got back to me with the statement, "As I said before, I do not want to speculate as to possible outcomes because each person and situation is different.  As you know, there is a specific process in place for ADA requests."


Just to catch you up on where we are time wise, it is now one month since my original inquiry!


The very next day, on September 23, 2014, I again sent an email to Attorney Finn asking the following question, "Let me put this another way, why aren't audio recordings included on the list of auxiliary aids and services provided by the CT Judicial Branch listed on the website.  See link."


http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/cl085_ADA.pdf


On September 26, 2014, Attorney Finn responded by saying,  "The list of auxiliary aids and services is not a comprehensive one...As Technologies change and advance, new options may become possible."  And it is true, above the list of auxiliary aids and services provided there is the statement, "These are some of the services/aids the Judicial Branch offers."  The word "some" appears to indicate that there are more.



On October 1, 2014, I then sent an email to Attorney Maureen Finn asking the following question, "So if the list of auxiliary aids and services were comprehensive it would include audiorecordings on it.  Is that what you are stating?"


I never received a response to that question, with either a yes or no, or any of Attorney Finn's favorite type answers such as, "I don't care to speculate."


I also asked Attorney Finn another vital question.  Given that there are Connecticut Practice Book policies in place under Chapter 1-10a and 1-10b for the public to request the right to make audiorecordings from the judge, would it then be correct for a litigant with a disability to go through a judge to obtain his or her reasonable modification, since the administration, as represented by Attorney Finn, was refusing to answer my questions.  However, I noted for Attorney Finn, there could be a problem in this situation because were a judge to rule improperly in response to such a request for reasonable modification, under the ADA that judge would be liable for damages and would lose his or her judicial immunity.  "What would she suggest?", I asked. 


In response, Attorney Finn stated, "As to your new question, I cannot advise you as to the best course of action."


So in total, it took a little over five weeks to go absolutely nowhere.  If I had been having this correspondence with a serious need to obtain audiorecording as a reasonable modification for an upcoming hearing, this back and forth conversation full of obstruction and obscure responses would have been incredibly stressful.  In my own case, I had conversations like this for three years and still didn't get anywhere while parallel legal proceedings were continuing on in my case.  This was incredibly difficult for me as it would be for any individual with a disability.


CONCLUSION:


The bottom line of this study is it showed quite clearly that the Connecticut Judicial Branch has no idea how to answer a straightforward question with a straightforward answer.


Throughout this communication with the CT Judicial Branch in regard to audiorecordings, Attorney Maureen Finn in her own person, and on behalf of all the others who were listed as receiving copies of our correspondence, was deliberately obstructive and obscure when I tried to get answers to questions in regard to the reasonable modification of audiorecordings, which it is my understanding the Branch is obligated to provide.

The Connecticut Judicial Branch is simply not in compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 or the Amendments Act to the ADA of 2008. Specifically, it is not in compliance with providing equally effective communication with people who have disabilities or those advocating for those who have disabilities.

Under Title II of the ADA, the Connecticut Judicial Branch is required to take steps to ensure that their communications with people with disabilities are as effective as communications with others. Title II of the ADA requires government entities, such as the Connecticut Judicial Branch, to make appropriate auxiliary aids and services available to ensure effective communication.  In other words, the Connecticut Judicial Branch, should, upon request, provide appropriate aids and services leading to effective communication for qualified individuals with disabilities and their advocates so they can participate equally in The Connecticut Judicial Branch's programs, services, and activities.

In their report on audiorecordings dated 2009, the Subcommittee on Audio Recording of Court Proceedings acknowledged that audiorecordings are the property of the citizens of Connecticut, and I would further note the important role audiorecordings could play in assisting persons with disabilities when it comes to obtaining access to legal proceedings.  Under those circumstances, the Connecticut Judicial Branch has no business denying people with disabilities access to these audiorecordings or obscuring information on whether such audiorecordings are available.

Saturday, January 3, 2015

PART I: CASE STUDY ON THE CT JUDICIAL BRANCH'S LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ADA LAW!

By Elizabeth A. Richter

INTRODUCTION:

As a citizen, I was interested in seeing whether there had been any improvements in the CT Judicial Branch response to inquiries in regard to the ADA since I first began to approach the Branch about the ADA in 2006.  After all, in January 2014, I received a letter from Attorney John Hughes stating he intended to conduct an investigation into CT Judicial Branch compliance with the ADA.  Since several news outlets reported on this investigation, you might imagine this would make the Branch more eager to demonstrate their compliance.

With this in mind, on August 21, 2014 I approached the CT Judicial Branch with a request  for information about the option of obtaining audiorecordings as a reasonable accommodation for a person with a disability.  This request showed a certain amount of prescience, because on October 14, 2014,  a Connecticut citizen, Adam McNiece,  filed a lawsuit complaining that the CT Judicial Branch denied him audiorecordings which he required as a reasonable accommodation for his disability. See link: 


http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2014/12/ct-law-tribune-pokes-fun-at-self.html


I was making the inquiry as an advocate, not as a person with a disability.  However, had I been a person with a disability such as Adam McNiece, the process of requesting reasonable accommodation would have been incredibly frustrating.  First, I couldn't obtain a timely response to my inquiry, so if I'd been asking according to the standard timeframe, i.e. two weeks prior to the hearing, I would not have been able to obtain the accommodation on time.  Second, for the life of me, I couldn't get a clear information from the CT Judicial Branch spokespeople with whom I came into contact in response to my questions.  This latter is a complete violation of the federal ADA mandate to provide effective communication with people who have disabilities, and also the mandate to provide full and relevant responses to inquiries. 


DATA:

On August 21, 2014, I wrote to Sandra Lugo-Gines, the staff member at the CT Judicial Branch generally considered in charge of all ADA inquiries.  My question:  "Will the Connecticut Judicial Branch provide audiorecordings of Legal Proceedings for litigants who have disabilities"

After sending that email, I waited for a full ten days and did not receive a single response from Ms. Sandra Lugo-Gines.  This is an unacceptably long time to wait for a response and shows how rude the CT Judicial Branch is in response to inquiries about the ADA.

On August 31, 2014, I then sent an email to other CT Judicial Branch employees, attorneys who have previously responded to my ADA questions and addressed the same inquiry to them.  The employees I sent the email to were as follows:  Heather Collins, Maureen Finn, Martin Libbin, and Viviana Livesay.  In my email, I provided a copy of the earlier August 21, 2014 email I'd sent  to Sandra Lugo-Gines and asked them to answer the question:  "What is the Connecticut Judicial Branch policy in regard to audiorecordings as a modification for a person with a disability under the ADA?"

Two days later, on September 2, 2014, I received a response from Attorney Maureen Finn stating as follows:


"There is no specific policy in regard to audio recordings.  As with any other aid or service, each request for accommodation is reviewed individually."


So, is that a "yes" or a "no"?  I wasn't sure.  In fact, Unbeknownst to me, right at that very time that I proposed that question, Mr. Adam McNiece, who had his doctor confirm the fact that he had a disability, had asked for just that accommodation of audiorecordings and had been turned down. 

To get an additional confirmation what Attorney Finn had said, I sent out the following question in response:
 
"I am assuming that anything listed on the CT Judicial Branch [website] as an aid or auxillary [service] would be automatically granted upon request [to a person with a disability].  Is that a correct?"
 
I also asked, "When you say, each case is reviewed individually, do you have a protocol for such a review?

And I asked, "What safeguards do you have in place to ensure that reasonable modifications are provided in a consistent manner?"

In response, the next day, on September 3, 2014, Attorney Finn sent me the following statement, "The items you request in the below email are not covered by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  The FOIA does not require public officials to answer questions regarding the specific laws that are relied upon when evaluating ADA requests.  The FOIA only provides a right to attend public meetings within the meaning of the FOIA."


I didn't ask for specific laws, I asked for "a protocol" and for "safeguards".  So what Attorney Finn did was simply reinterpret my request so that she could then deny it.  Also, when she states that the FOIA only "provides a right to attend public meetings" she forgets all the CT Judicial Branch internal reports and training materials that she has previously handed over to me personally in response to my FOIA requests.  That goes well beyond the opportunity to attend public meetings!  So, essentially, in her response, Attorney Finn is playing around with words, redefining my questions in a way I did not intend, if not outright lying.

Then Attorney Finn continues on to say, "I can advise you that we do not review requests for accommodation in an automated fashion.  All are reviewed on an individual basis."

In other words, no person with a disability can be guaranteed that he or she will have access to the aids and auxillary services that the CT Judicial Branch has available even if they are listed as available on its website.  And while it sounds nice that each person with a disability will be considered on an individual basis, the fact that such individuals cannot be guaranteed even a minimal level of  reasonable modifications has to be terribly anxiety provoking.  It places people with disabilities in a permanent posture of supplication, which is actually rather humiliating and degrading.

Later that afternoon, on September 3, 2014, I responded to Attorney Finn by saying, I don't get the FOIA reference, but  would the following statement reflect the CT Judicial Branch's position on audiorecordings.  See the following which I wrote:

"The CT Judicial Branch reviews request for reasonable modifications on an individual basis.  Audiorecordings are one of the reasonable modifications which are an option for litigants and jurors with disabilities and the Branch will consider whether the accommodation of audiorecordings makes sense for a litigant with a disability on a case by case basis."


In response, on September 4, 2014 Attorney Finn stated, "Again, there is no separate policy in regard to audiorecordings.  If someone requests audiorecordings as an accommodation, that request will be reviewed in the same manner as any other ADA request."

Of course, this is not a "yes" or "no"!  Also, we are well aware, that even as Attorney Finn was stating that the CT Judicial Branch would review a request for audiorecordings as an accommodation "in the same manner as any other ADA request" the Judicial Branch was turning down Adam McNiece's fully documented request for that very same accommodation!"
 
Given what McNiece was going through, my next question sent an hour later has particular relevance.  I asked Attorney Finn the following, "Would there ever be a reasonable basis for turning down such a request to a qualified individual with a disability?  If so what would that be?"
 
So there was a pause in the conversation.

September 5, 2014 goes by.

September 6, 2014 goes by.

September 7, 2014 goes by.

September 8, 2014 goes by.

Then on September 9, 2014, at 4:44p.m., I received the following answer from Attorney Finn:

"I prefer not to speculate about possibilities.  I don't think it is productive and it can create confusion."

As if I wasn't already totally confused already!