MICHAEL NOWACKI LETTER TO JUDICIAL REVIEW COUNCIL ATTACKS ETHICAL VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY PROMINENT JUDGES WITH TIES TO THE AFCC!

Scott Murphy Esq.
Executive Director
Judicial Review Council
505 Hudson Street
Hartford, CT
 

                                                                   September 16, 2013

Dear Attorney Murphy:
 

As we discussed in July, here are four complaints filed with the Judicial Review Council concerning four judges (The Honorable Lynda Munro, the Honorable Gerald Adelman, the Honorable  Holly Abery-Wetstone and the Honorable Harry E. Calmar) who are alleged in having engaged in conduct which violate the Code of Judicial Conduct.
 

 

In our July phone conversations, you indicated it was not necessary to produce 14 sets of the identical exhibits to be shared on each of the four complaints which are properly notarized.  I have included 14 sets of the relevant documents to support the claims for the individual complaints—since they all cite the same violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted on January 1, 2011.
 

This letter provides the background on establishing grounds for sanctions for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for all four complaints.
 

 I am also seeking the recusal of the Honorable Eliot Solomon and the Honorable Julia D. Dewey, who have long standing ties to the four respondents for these complaints inasmuch as they both served for a period of time on the Family Commission and as family court judges during the six year period of time in which the Honorable Lynda Munro served as the Chief Administrative Judge of Family Matters from September 1, 2007 to August 30, 2013.

 

The regulations of the Judicial Review Council concerning conflicts of interest state:

 

1.  Any member of the Council who has a conflict of interest in any matter before the Council shall be disqualified from participating in any proceeding of the Council in that matter.
 

2. A member shall have such conflict of interest when such member, his or her spouse, his or her child, or his or her business associate (a) has a direct personal or financial interest in said matter; (b) has a business, personal, or financial relationship with any complainant, witness, or respondent in said matter; (c) has a direct personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary matters before the counsel; (d) is related to a complaint, witness or respondent in said matter; (e) is a judge whom the complainant has made a previous complaint; (f) is an attorney who has any matter pending in a trial court or an appeal court involving a respondent against whom a complaint has been made; or (g) in any other situation, believes that he or she has, or may appear to have a conflict of interest. (emphasis not added).
 

On April 19, 2013, the Committee on Judicial Ethics issued four important advisory decisions that were labeled 2013-2015, 2013-2016, 2013-2017 and 2013-2018.
 

For the first time, the Committee on Judicial ethics provided a jurisdictional and directional opinion that indicated that sitting on the Board of Directors of a not for profit corporation (which was not referenced as the AFCC specifically) , in which contracts have been awarded to Board of Directors firms would violate the Code of Judicial Ethics Rule 3.7 (a) (6) (B).
 

“…Based upon the foregoing, an appearance of impropriety would arise if a Judicial Official serving on the board of directors of a nonprofit organization or members of the Judicial Official’s staff were to refer clients to the nonprofit organization.  Further the nonprofit organization may use or attempt to use the prestige of the Judicial Official’s office when seeking additional contracts with the Judicial Branch or others.  Accordingly, the Committee, with one member recused, unanimously determined serve on the nonprofit organization’s board of directors would violate Rules 1.2, 1.3, 3.1 and 3.7.”
 

Despite this clear admonition from the Committee on Judicial Ethics, Judge Lynda Munro continued in her position as a member of the Board of Directors of the Connecticut AFCC Chapter and further involved members of the judicial staff in the preparation of materials for the AFCC’s 50^th Anniversary Convention to be conducted in Los Angeles from May 28 to June 1.
 

Judge Munro appeared on a panel she recruited in Los Angeles with Sharon Wicks Dornfeld (the Connecticut Bar Association Chair for Family Relations matters), Dr. Sidney Horowitz (who has been appointed in hundreds of family relations cases as a court appointee doing substantive assigned work in family courts in the State of Connecticut including cases in Judge Munro’s direct supervision), and Dr. Howard Kreiger (who also does outsourced work as a court appointee including in Judge Munro’s courts since here appointment in 2007 as the Chief Administrative Judge in the State of Connecticut).
 

In addition to these four panelists, a number of Board of Directors members of the Connecticut AFCC Chapter, not only are appointed for work by judges in the family courts, but specifically testified in Judge Munro’s courtroom without any acknowledgment of the direct professional, non-courtroom contact with Judge Munro.

 

The Committee on Judicial Ethics advisory opinions including 2013-15 and 2013-16, (while not definitely binding on the Judicial Review Council by virtue of “adopted” rules governing the operations of the Committee on Judicial Ethics) can be considered a “bright line” guidance in the determination to the whether Rules 1.2, 1.3, 3.1 and 3.7 were violated as alleged in the filing of four properly filed, sworn and articulated grievances naming Judge Lynda Munro, Judge Gerald Adelman, Judge Holly Abery-Wetstone and Judge Harry E. Calmar.

 

As the Chief Administrative Judge of Family matters, Judge Munro had an influence on the direct operations of all family court docketed cases, and then influenced which cases were reassigned to the regional family trial docket.
 

Only Judge Adelman now remains as a judge on matters reassigned to the Middletown Superior Court where Judge Adelman remains on cases referenced to the Regional Family Trial docket.
 

My case FST FA 04 0201276S was without motion transferred to the RFTD and assigned to Judge Harry Calmar, after I began investigating Judge Munro’s operations in the Family Commission—many of whom attended AFCC conferences and ran its operations from their desks as employees of the Connecticut Judiciary.
 

The use of employees of the Connecticut judiciary to produce materials for the CT AFCC meeting on April 12 and for the AFCC National Convention and use federal grant funding for ‘court operations” to expense such a trip to “accompany” Judge Munro to Los Angeles, Orlando and other undisclosed locations from 2007-2013 is an alleged violation of Rule 1.3 which states: “A judge shall not use or attempt to use the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of  the judge or others, or allow others to do so.”

 

In sending out invitations from judicial mailboxes from the Connecticut AFCC Organizing Committee, Marilou Giovannucci operated as the President Elect of the AFCC Connecticut Chapter on behalf of the Board of Directors, who included Judges Munro, Adelman and Holly Abery-Wetstone.
 

It could not be determined as to whether the list of attendees of the AFCC Conference was kept on judicial computers, but it certainly requires the JRC to investigate the use of judicial employees to recruit participation in a private organization which Judge Munro had such a documented relationship having expensed trips to the taxpayers from 2007-2013.

The expense reports to validate these assertions that Rule 1.3 was violated are attached to this complaint.
 

Despite the rulings on these four advisory opinions issued by the Committee on Judicial Ethics, The Honorable Lynda Munro (and members of her administrative staff) continued to utilize judicial financial resources to promote an organization, the Connecticut Chapter of American Family of Conciliation Courts whose Board of Directors have ties to contracts awarded by the judiciary.

 

It was only on March 26, 2013, when it was revealed that incorporation status was filed by the Connecticut Chapter of the AFCC, through a member of the Board of Directors, whose name is Robert Zaslow, that three judges were sitting on the Board of Directors of the Connecticut AFCC Chapter.

 

On or about March 14, 2013, a Connecticut judiciary employee, Marilou Giovanucci, (listed on the registration for non-stock corporation status as the “President Elect of the Connecticut Chapter of the AFCC) from her judiciary mailbox address, sent an email “on behalf of the Ct. AFCC coordinating Committee to a “Annual Conference” to be held to an estimated 700 lawyers who have been appointed to positions by The Honorable Lynda Munro, The Honorable Gerald Adelman, the Honorable Holly Abery-Wetstone and the Honorable Harry E. Calmar which invited them to the “First” AFCC Connecticut Chapter Conference on April 12, 2013 to be conducted at Quinnipiac University, where Judge Munro also serves as an adjunct professor.

 

The notice of the conference fees for attendees of AFCC failed to note that sales taxes were due for attendees at such the April 12 conference.
 

The list of the “invitees” included over 700 lawyers who have been appointed to assignments as Guardian Ad Litems and Attorneys for the minor children, family court employees, appointed psychologists/psychiatrist and others who completed the GAL and AMC training mandated by Connecticut Practice Book Rule 25-62 and 25-62a.
 

The use of public employees of the judiciary of the State of Connecticut to promote the nonprofit Connecticut Chapter of the AFCC for which Honorable Lynda Munro, Honorable Gerald Adelman and Honorable Holly Abery-Wetstone are listed as members of the Connecticut Chapter of the AFCC Board of Directors is alleged herein to be a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1, Rule 1.2.

 

Inasmuch as Judge Lynda Munro’s presentation to the AFCC  meeting in Los Angeles listed four judges who were involved in the GAL and AMC training:  Judge Lynda Munro, Judge Holly Abery-Wetstone, Judge Harry E. Calmar and Judge Gerald Adelman, there is little question Rule 3.7 (6) (A) and (B).

 

In the case of this complainant, the Honorable Harry E. Calmar in March 2010, appointed Dr. Kenneth Robson to conduct an updated psychological/psychiatric examination of the complainant, while at the same time promoting the GAL/AMC training seminars at Quinnipiac University---without acknowledging the connection between the presiding Judge Calmar’s ties to Dr. Kenneth Robson. 
 

Dr. Robson, spent less than three minutes with me, in April 2010, and then Judge Calmar used that opinion of Dr. Robson, as a significant benchmarking tool in my docket file FST FA 04 0201276S.  A copy of that psychiatric opinion of Dr. Robson, who in three minutes, issued a psychiatric opinion which had no validity.
 

Dr. Robson, in the Liberti v. Liberti case, in sworn testimony suggested he could complete a psychiatric evaluation in three minutes or less.  Such “quackery” espoused by Dr. Robson in my family case and in the case of Sunny Kelley Liberti ended her custodial rights as well.

 

The use of judicial employees to carry out the promotion of the private interests of Honorable Lynda Munro in the AFCC Section 3.7 (4) as a fundraising activity for the Connecticut Chapter of the AFCC on April 12, 2013, is alleged to violate the Code of Judicial Conduct 3.7 (6) (A) and (B).

 

After the issuance of the opinion by the Committee on Judicial Ethics on April 19, 2013, listed as 2013-15, Judge Munro is alleged in this complaint to have further “sullied” the reputation of the judiciary, by billing her trip expenses to attend the AFCC 50^th Anniversary in Los Angeles to an account identified as SID #22523 ($1,607.65), “identified in the supporting documents as a Court Improvement Grant.”  Also attending the Los Angeles AFCC meeting were Connecticut Judiciary “Court Operations” employees.
 

Judge Munro and others also traveled to Orlando, Florida for the 2012 AFCC National Convention which was also billed to SID #22523—all expensed to various budget centers.    
 

Please see the validation that expenses were also paid to travel to Los Angeles out of the same state funds for the travels of Marilou Giovannucci ($1,195.71) , who lists her title as Manager, Court Services Operation, Johanna Greenfield ($1.062.33) , Caseflow Management Specialist (who also sits on the Family Commission), David Iacarrino ($1,0687.09)  Deputy Director of Court Operations (who also sits on the Family Commission, which Judge Munro served as the Chair), Linda Sabatelli ($1,110.60) and Rhonda Lucino. ($200.00 conference fee).

 

Judge Lynda Munro’s 2012 AFCC trip fees were also “expensed” by Judge Munro for Orlando for the AFCC convention , along with Marth Boyer ($1,159.39) Linda Sabatelli$1,423.38) and Marilou Giovannucci ($1,160.35).
 

Expense reports for the attendance of Judge Lynda Munro and Marilou Giovannucci go back to as early as 2007, charged to SID 22151.    

 

Included on the panel discussion in Los Angeles for the period of time of May 29-June 1 were invited panelists Dr. Sidney Horowitz (who was listed as a member of the Connecticut Chapter and Dr. Howard Kreiger.  It is not known as to whether Dr. Horowitz and Kreiger had their expenses paid through the judiciary or not.
 

So, the question for the JRC is this, how can proper sanctions been put into place to hold these four judges accountable for their conduct in family cases in which AFCC memberships are not able to be traced back to prior years.

 

The appointment of Judge Elliot Solomon to the Assistant Chief Administrative Judge of the State of Connecticut, effective October 1, 2013, creates additional conflicts of interest inasmuch as a Judge Solomon has an administrative role in the training of judges for the proper implementation of the Judicial Code of Ethics.

 

There is little debate at the Committee of Judicial Ethics about the declaration of impropriety of sitting on the AFCC Board of Directors in which contracts were doled out by members of the judiciary.

 

The Auditors for Public Accounts issued reports for Judiciary Branch and Child Protective Services (a division of the judiciary until Public Act 10-48 changed the reporting responsibilities of CPS to the Office of Public Defenders.

 

The reports from the Auditors of Public Accounts clearly defines material weakness in the operation of the judiciary in which there are no receipts or contracts for for millions of dollars of federal funding granted to the judiciary.
 

The minutes to Judge Solomon’s videoconferencing committee record a “grant” was awarded for the expansion videoconference capabilities, but Judge Solomon also said that the funding was not specifically awarded for that use.
 

With Judge Solomon’s recent appointment to the JRC, there are serious credibility issues for the JRC which are inherent in Judge Solomon’s tenure on the Family Commission.
 

In the recent history of the JRC, hundreds of complaints have been issued against family court judges including Judge Munro.
 

There is no way to assess how many judges have been sitting on Connecticut Bar Association Committees (a matter addressed in advisory opinion 2013-16) or the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers (2013-18) because the committee structure of the CBA is not a publicly accessible document.
 

The allegations set forth in these complaints establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the ties to the AFCC violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and sanctions are warranted via the conducting of a public hearing on the allegations set forth in these four complaints.
 

Please do not hesitate to contact me to testify with others at a public hearing at which point in time transcripts will be presented to the counsel which validate that the conflicts of interest in the AFCC and its ties to the AMC and GAL training commenced in 2011 were never acknowledged to the parties engaged in family court litigation in the courtrooms of these four judges.
 

As an aggrieved party, from such bias and prejudice, only sanctions will send a clear message that such affiliations with the AFCC were inappropriate inasmuch as they were never disclosed as a “clear and present danger” to the integrity and independence of the family court system in Connecticut.
 

Cordially,

 

Michael Nowacki

319 Lost District Drive
New Canaan, CT  06840
mnowacki@aol.com
(203) 273-4296

 

Enclosures:

 

1. List of Council Members—2 pages

2. Handbook of Committee Regulations—6 pages

3. Committee on Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2013-15 dated 4/19/2013—2 pages

4. Purpose of the CT AFCC Chapter—1 page

5. Email dated March 12, 2013 from Marilou Giovannucci inviting over 700 people listed on the email chain sent from her email address marilou.giovannucci@jud.ct.gov

6.  Four page description of the First Annual AFCC Conference on April 12, 2013 including fee structure

7.  Four page article appearing on Washington Times raising conflict of interest issues for Connecticut judges and history of Connecticut AFCC chapter—4 pages

7.  Committee on Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2013-16 dated 4/19/2013—2 pages

8.  Committee on Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2013-17 dated 4/19/2013—3 pages

9. Committee on Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2013-18 dated 4/19/2013—3pages

10. Copy of Four pages of FOI requests and responses from Melissa Farley—4 pages

11.  Copy of document expensing the membership of the AFCC of Judge Munro—1 page

12.  Copy of 4 pages of emails approving various judiciary employees to attend AFCC meeting on April 4 sent from mailbox of Debra Kulak one of the founding members of the CT AFCC Chapter noted in Washington Times article—4 pages

13.  Expense reports for travel from Judge Lynda Munro, Marilou Giovannucci, Johanna Greenfield, David Iaccarino, Linda Sabatelli, Rhonda Lucino, Mary Kay West, Martha Boyerl

14.  Program for AFCC conference in Los Angeles—Judge Munro was on Panel 64

15.  List of Family Commission members as of September 15, 2013

PART II: UWY-FA10-4022992-S, SHAWN TITTLE v. SUSAN SKIPP-TITTLE, JUDGE MUNRO TELLS MORE LIES...

In the Memorandum of Decision in this case dated October 16, 2012, on page 13 going to the top of page 14, Judge Lynda Munro discusses information related to the childrens' psychologist, Dr. Sidney Horowitz.  However, as with everything Judge Munro states, there is crucial information not included in her narrative. 

 

So first let's get to what Judge Munro does say. 

 

She states that Dr. Sidney Horowitz recused himself from his role as the childrens' psychologist because Ms. Skipp sent him so many emails--he said around 22 per day for 18 months.  Apparently, Dr. Horowitz found these emails so "relentless" and their "contents so charged" that he could no longer treat the children because he was biased against their mother. 

 

Further, Judge Munro deplores the fact that the children have lost the safe haven such therapy with Dr. Horowitz would have provided. 

 

Of course, I dispute the definition of an email that this discussion presumes.  For example, when I write an email, it is a thing of beauty ordinarily including at least several paragraphs.  I can recall putting together several such emails during the course of my divorce case. 

 

However, when it comes to Susan Skipp, an email really consists of maybe one or two sentences.  So if Susan wrote 22 emails in a single day of sending out one or two sentence emails, that very same amount would be 1 very lengthy email with 22 or more sentences on it were it me.  Since Susan wrote all these emails on her cell phone, my guess is what she did was more like texting than emailing.

 

So initially although it sounds quite alarming that Susan sent out 22 emails in a single day, if she sent that many--I doubt it--once you get they were most likely single sentence emails, it doesn't seem to be quite as exciting.  I also believe that the reason why Susan Skipp sent out so many emails was because frequently no one answered her emails and she was insisting on getting an answer!  

 

Now let's move to the more important issues that Judge Lynda Munro does not mention in connection to Dr. Sidney Horowitz.  

 

For 18 months Dr. Sidney Horowitz had received these emails from Susan Skipp and did not choose to resign from the case.  

 

The actual impetus for Dr. Horowitz's resignation was that on March 24, 2012 Ms. Skipp sent to Dr. Horowitz an email stating "In addition to my children's records with your notes, please provide the diagnosis for which insurance agrees to provide long term therapy and an itemized billing since your involvement with our family." 

 

The very next day, suddenly and without warning, on March 25, 2012, Dr. Sidney Horowitz sent an email to the Guardian Ad Litem resigning from the case. 

 

Dr. Horowitz also stated, and Judge Lynda Munro included this point in her Memorandum of Decision, that it was "the first time in his professional career that I have recused myself from" a case. However, Dr. Sidney Horowitz was lying when he said that and thus he perjured himself.  In fact, he recused himself from at least another case:  Granjales v. Bell, 2009 WL 3086476, 16 (Conn. Super. 2009), and I'll bet I'd find more if I scratched the surface a bit. 

 

What Susan Skipp had discovered was that from August 23, 2010 until December 19, 2011, Dr. Horowitz was billing the children's insurance company (Aetna) with the diagnosis code of 296.22 which is "major depressive disorder."  As Dr. Horowitz testified on the Stand on August 15, 2012, the children do not have this diagnosis--their diagnosis is Adjustment Disorder. 

 

To me it appears quite obvious that Dr. Horowitz billed for the more serious diagnosis so that he could receive a higher financial reimbursement from the insurance company for that diagnosis. 

 

What he did was fraud and malpractice pure and simple. 

 

During the trial, Dr. Sidney Horowitz stated that the mistake in the diagnostic code was simply a "clerical error" and no more.  However, the description Susan Skipp provides regarding how the diagnostic code was included on the billing precludes the possibility that it could have been a clerical error.  

 

She states, "I witnessed the manner in which Dr. Horowitz submitted his billing.  At the end of each session with the children, Dr. Horowitz would fill out a billing statement, and hand write a diagnosis code onto each statement.  He would then have me carry the statement to the office receptionist.  At that point, I would pay the co-pay for the visit." 

 

In other words, Dr. Horowitz wrote out the incorrect diagnostic code onto statements he filled out for 18 months until Susan Skipp confronted him. 

 

Thus, Dr. Horowitz's explanation is simply not credible. 

 

In his testimony on August 15, 2012, Dr. Sidney Horowitz also stated that another reason for his decision to recuse himself from the case was because Susan Skipp filed a Motion In Limine in regard to his testimony.  However, this Motion in Limine was filed on April 24, 2012, well after Horowitz had recused himself.  So, in essence, Dr. Horowitz perjured himself again with that explanation. 

I would only ask the question of why Judge Lynda Munro allowed Dr. Horowitz to commit such obvious acts of perjury without holding him accountable. 

 

Once Susan Skipp began to suspect there were problems with Dr. Horowitz's billing practices, she then requested itemized billing statements from both Dr. Horowitz himself and his office staff.  In addition, Ms. Skipp requested copies of her childrens' medical records.  Dr. Horowitz refused to respond to either request, which is a violation of her rights, and, in my opinion, a tacit acknowledgement of his wrongdoing.  After all, if he didn't do anything wrong, why would he feel the need to withhold the requested documents?  

 

Then, in the course of making these requests, in talking to Dr. Horowitz's receptionist, Susan Skipp discovered that Dr. Horowitz only utilized one chart for both of her children.  In essence, Dr. Horowitz was billing the insurance company for both children solely under the name of the oldest child.  This again is a questionable practice. It is a standard procedure in medical offices for each client to have an individual file.  Otherwise, how can you possibly differentiate between them?

 

I can only imagine the shock, confusion and betrayal that Susan Skipp must have felt when she finally understood the nature of the original incorrect diagnosis that Dr. Sidney Horowitz had given her children.  Yes, Dr. Horowitz did call up the insurance company and reported what he had done wrong.  However, he never gave Susan Skipp a call to explain what had been going on.  For the entire 18 months the children were in his care, he had refused to provide any diagnosis to Susan, despite her frequent requests that he do so.  It is only reasonable that a mother should be kept informed regarding her childrens' diagnoses.  It is her  right to know. 

Eventually, Susan Skipp found out on her own that her children had been diagnosed with a major depressive disorder and became extremely alarmed.  She called up the GAL who told her the diagnosis was no big deal.  Then not long after that her daughter expressed some suicidal thoughts and Susan Skipp naturally became extremely distraught.  I will discuss this more in a later blog.

Meanwhile, the bottom line is that what Dr. Sidney Horowitz did is a serious violation of his professional ethics and he should have been held accountable for his actions. Instead, Judge Lynda Munro gave him a free pass and lied about what happened not only through the omission of facts, but also by lying outright.   

 

Once you know that Dr. Horowitz committed insurance fraud, how can you possibly trust anything Dr. Horowitz has to say. 

 

What is clear to anyone who reads Dr. Horowitz's testimony is that he found Susan Skipp's insistence on the truth annoying, while he found Shawn Tittle's obsequious fawning much more preferable.  As Dr. Horowitz reported, he really liked the father because, in his words, Mr. Tittle asked me for the names of books and articles to read and "echoed back to me that he understood" my recommendations.  What an ego boost it must have been for Dr. Horowitz having Mr. Tittle echo back his ideas. 

How could the Skipp children ever find a "safe haven" with a narcissistic, lying fraud like Dr. Sidney Horowitz?  That's my question.   

 

So, again, Judge Lynda Munro repeatedly omits and skews major parts of the story in her Memorandum of Decision regarding this case.  That is a fundamentally dishonest thing to do and disgraceful on the part of a Judge who is sworn to uphold the law. 

More on this later

RELATED ARTICLES:

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/uwy-fa10-4022991-s-shawn-tittle-v-susan.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/part-iii-uwy-fa10-4022992-s-shawn.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/part-iv-uwy-fa10-4022992-s-shawn-tittle.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/part-v-uwy-fa10-4022992-s-shawn-tittle.html
 

PART V: UWY-FA10-4022992-S, SHAWN TITTLE v. SUSAN SKIPP-TITTLE, JUDGE LYNDA MUNRO MAKES UP THE LAW AS SHE GOES ALONG!

I just have to tell you before I go into my blog here.  I was looking up the Skipp-Tittle case and  found out that Shawn Tittle has not paid outstanding tuition bills for the Montessori School the children were in last year.  The school is going to civil court to get the money.  You see, all the while that the trial court is talking about what a great guy Shawn Tittle is, and how he should have sole custody because he loves the children so much, he is really busy not meeting his obligations to them! 

Furthermore, this is a man with a lengthy history of alcohol and substance abuse, an equally lengthy history of mistreating women.  And he is a man who was known to have  carried on affairs during  marriage, and to have been indifferent to the needs of his children.   

 

Given that situation, how does Judge Lynda Munro justify a decision like this denying a mother any access to her children? 

 

If you will look at page 3 of the Memorandum of Decision dated October 16, 2012 under "Legal Standard", Judge Munro explains it as follows:  "the court looks to the judgment orders to determine whether they remain in the chidlren's best interest, or, were not in the best interest of the children at the time they were entered."

 

Wait a minute.  "Were not in the best interest of the children at the time they were entered."  Where did that come from?  I have never heard of that standard before--that is a big enough loophole to drive a mack truck through it.  That kind of standard pretty much adds up to saying that custody can  be changed if the trial judge feels like it.  But what happened to the rule I was always told about, that judges are not allowed to reverse another judges' ruling. 

Next there is the standard that I am more familiar with, the concept that custody can be changed if it is proven that there has been a substantial change in circumstances.  As Judge Munro puts it, "it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstances warrant a modification of the existing order."

Why? 

Because "the trial court's discretion includes only the power to adapt the order to some distinct and definite change in the circumstances or conditions of the parties."  It is not, Judge Munro cautions, an opportunity to "retry issues already decided...or to allow the parties to use a motion to modify as an appeal." 

 

In other words, "Its inquiry is necessarily confined to a comparison between the current conditions and the last court order."  Once the court has determined that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, then the Judge must make his or her custody decision based upon the best interests of the child standard.  It is after this point that my credulity gets strained.  If there is one thing Susan Skipp's attorney stated repeatedly, it is that from the date of dissolution on March 28, 2011 up until the trial in August 2012, there really was no change in circumstances. 

 

For instance, the Memorandum of Decision dated October 16, 2012 includes sufficient narrative to indicate very clearly that both Shawn Tittle and Susan Skipp do not get along very well.  Both parties weren't getting along with one another at the time of dissolution, which is why there was so much detail regarding how the parties were not supposed to talk about one another in front of others, and that situation continued on up to the time of trial. 

The situation might have improved had Dr. Sidney Horowitz, Dr. Howard Krieger, and the GAL, Mary Brigham actually done the jobs they were hired to do.  Instead, the first two were so busy sucking money out of the health insurance company with their schemes, and the latter was so focused on charging up more money, they couldn't be bothered.  In addition, they were having too much fun collecting as much evidence they could find in order to deny Susan Skipp custody of her children that they didn't do anything to reduce the conflict and focus on improving the lives of the children. 

 

Susan Skipp is a strong willed person who has no problem stating what she thinks and challenging what she believes is wrong.  This was true at the time of dissolution, and it was still true at the time of trial.  So was there any substantial change in circumstances?  No.  So there was no legal basis for a change in custody. 

 

The reason why Judge Lynda Munro proceeded to make a change in the custody nonetheless is -- you've guessed it!  She determined that, in her view, Susan Skipp had committed Parental Alienation.  As Judge Munro states on page 9, "defendant has been coaching the children and alienating them from plaintiff [father]."  And here again on page 11, Judge Munro accuses Susan of "actively grooming [the children] for alienation from their father.", and on page 14, "Ms. Skipp not only does not seek to advance the chidlren's relationship with their father, she has steadfastly sought to undermine it."  and it goes on and on. 

Of course, the problem is that when women legitimately bring up how they  and their children have been abused during a marriage, the trial court generally attempts to invalidate those disclosures by describing them as alienation.  What the trial court is really saying here to women is that they want Susan and women like her to be silent about the abuse.  But this is the modern world, not the dark ages.  We have the "one billion rising compaign", and as women, we will no longer be silent about abuse.  

 

Did Judge Munro have the opportunity to learn about the abuse?  It is pretty clear that no matter how much evidence Susan Skipp presented in regard to Shawn Tittle's abuse, not only of herself but also of the children, Judge Munro insisted on stating it didn't exist.  In fact, while I read the Memorandum of Decision I sometimes wondered if I had been at the same trial. 

 

It is also important to note that, currently in Connecticut parental alienation is not a legal basis for changing custody from one parent to the other.  This is why my colleagues are working on drafting PAS legislation which they intend to present eventually to the judiciary committee--because it doesn't yet exist.  How is it that Judge Munro is using parental alienation as the basis for her decision when legally speaking she isn't allowed to do so.  And why is it that, you will quickly see if you read my other discussions of similar cases, there are so many other Judges who have also used parental alienation as the basis for a change of custody when there is still, in Connecticut, no legal grounds whatsoever for doing such a thing. 

 

What I find particularly troubling about Susan Skipp's case, and those similar to it, is the fact that the trial court, the attorneys, and the judges so clearly deny such women custody because they are strong, intelligent women.  If a woman litigant in a family court case ever begins to hear how intelligent she is, that is a major reason to be alarmed.  Use of that  term in family court in describing a mother is an indication that they dislike you intensely and will do all that they can to destroy you.  The spin on the definition of the word "intelligent" as they use it is to imply a kind of wicked, evil intelligence.  Thus, Judge Munro calls Susan "shrewd" as if the intelligence is solely for the purposes of deceitfulness. 

 

Simply put, family court finds any woman's intelligence a threat.  I would suspect that if you did a study that among the women who have been denied custody you will find a considerable number of professional women--teachers, filmmakers, scholars, executives, and small businesswomen.  In 1991, The Connecticut Task Force on Gener, Justice and the Courts determined that there was widespread bias against women in the Connecticut Judicial System.  Part of the recommended solution was to hire more women judges. 

 

Unfortunately, in doing so, what Connecticut did was locate the most radically anti-female attorneys they could find and appointed them to the bench.  In many regards, these newly appointed women judges--gender traitors, as I call them--have been more vicious and more vengeful towards women than any male judge would consider being.  This has been a very successful strategy the Connecticut Judicial Branch has utilized in order to maintain the oppression of women. 

 

My word to those women judges is--shame on you.  You owe your jobs to us, to the women who fought so hard to get those jobs for you.  You have a responsibility to give back to the citizens who put you where you are and gave you the privileges you are currently enjoying.  It is time to give back to the women who gave you your jobs in the first place.  

 

Susan Skipp lost custody of her children and Judge Lynda Munro placed her on supervised visitation. Of course, I have advised her, as has everyone else who knows anything about the Connecticut Judicial System not to participate in this supervised visitation.  Why? 

Supervised visitation is for violent criminals or parents who have physicially abused their children.  Susan is a good mother, a teacher, and a citizen who is well respected in the community.  She should not be subjected to this kind of unjust humiliation in front of her own children.

Also, essentially because such programs are simply used as a means to collect more falsified documentation which will then be used to prevent Susan from ever seeing her children.  But even if Susan cooperated and attempted to use a visitation service, the likelihood is that the cost is so prohibitive that Susan would not be able to use it for very long. 

 

The result is that Susan has not seen her children since this judgment came out.  I can only imagine how awful it is for two young children--9 and 12--to be in a situation where they are unable to see their mother who has always been their primary caretaker.  But I know that with her strength and determination, Susan will be able to see her children very soon. 

 

I'll tell you what this is, Judge Munro, this is just plain old child abuse.  Judge Munro, by no means can any reasonable, rational, or sane person consider depriving young children of their mother and then say it is in the best interests of the children.  Your actions show you to be a mean, hateful, lying hypocrite.  

RELATED ARTICLES:

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/uwy-fa10-4022991-s-shawn-tittle-v-susan.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/part-ii-uwy-fa10-4022992-s-shawn-tittle.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/part-iii-uwy-fa10-4022992-s-shawn.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/02/part-iv-uwy-fa10-4022992-s-shawn-tittle.html

PART I: UWY-FA10-4022991-S, SHAWN TITTLE v. SUSAN SKIPP-TITTLE, JUDGE LYNDA MUNRO LIES, LIES, AND LIES AGAIN

I am one of these people who came from a very dysfunctional family from very early in my life, and one of the first thing I learned from that was how to keep my mouth shut.  If there was one thing my parents were very firm about, it was that what happens in the family, stays in the family.  Blood is blood.  It was a kind of family honor type thing. 

 

So when I ended up in therapy at the age of ten as the Identified Patient, I spent two years going to sessions on a weekly basis, staring silently at the psychologist.  Then, what I learned as the years went by is: it's a man's world, keep your mouth shut. 

 

So, you can imagine how I felt when I met Susan Skipp.  Because this is a person who will not keep silent, who will not compromise, and who expects to be treated as a human being.   This is a woman speaking up and speaking out about the corruption of family court! 

 

So what happened in this case? Again, I'll tell you right up front so you don't have to live with the suspense.  Basically, Susan Skipp lost custody of her two children and is no longer able to see them. 

 

How did this happen? 

 

I'd say through a lot of bullying and lying, and through the spread of misrepresentations, and half truths. 

 

Who did the most of it? 

 

Well, there are a lot of competitors for this position, but I'd say Judge Lynda Munro truly wins the title in this particular case as the person who lied the most. 

 

For example, In the opening paragraph of her Memorandum of Decision dated October 16, 2012, Judge Lynda Munro implies that both parties were on an equal footing during the court proceedings, i.e.  "Both counsel tried this case with experience and skill." 

 

Oh, give me a break. 

 

The bottom line is that for much of the time in this case Susan Skipp  was forced to represent herself.  She was lucky enough to obtain representation for the trial at the last minute.  However, let's be clear.  Susan's attorney had around one year of experience and maybe five weeks to prepare, while Shawn's attorney had over thirty years of experience and a couple years to prepare. 

 

The end result is that Shawn's attorney got away with a few things; for example, bringing in numerous exhibits that were not disclosed prior to trial.  And just, no matter how hard Susan's attorney worked, and no matter how smart she was, and she was smart, one year of experience is going to be struggling in the face of thirty.

 

Next, Judge Munro states, "Both were respectful to the parties and witnesses."  No, that simply isn't true.  I watched the entire trial.  During the proceedings, Shawn's attorney was bullying and disrespectful towards Susan Skipp and Judge Munro did nothing to stop it.  I don't think anyone should be subjected to that kind of treatment.  

 

Later in the Memorandum of Decision, Judge Munro misreports an incident which occurred with the father and places it within a false context.  Apparently, prior to judgment Shawn Tittle drove his car into the side of a fast food restaurant in the take out lane. 

 

Judge Munro explained away the incident, stating that it happened because Mr. Tittle was exhausted from work and that the situation may have been made worse by the ADHD medication he was taking. 

 

What Judge Munro doesn't say is that Shawn Tittle was charged with DUI and that he plea bargained his way out of the charges. 

 

Hello!  Innocent people go to trial and are cleared of the charges.  

 

She also doesn't mention the fact that Mr. Tittle attempted to evade responsibility by driving away from the scene of an accident and had to be pursued by police cars. In addition, it came out in court that Shawn switched places with his passenger in order to escape charges.

 

That,  ladies and gentlemen, is illegal.  It is not the behavior of a reliable or responsible person. 

 

Susan Skipp was perfectly within her rights to raise concerns about the father after this incident, and the idea that she should have shut up about it is ridiculous.

 

Another incident Judge Munro talks about is when Susan Skipp filed a complaint with the police because she believed that her ex, Shawn Tittle, tried to hit her with his car.  Judge Munro attempts to invalidate Susan's decision to file a complaint because 1) Shawn denied it, and 2) according to Judge Munro's reporting of the story, a witness told the police "he did not think the driver was trying to hit" Susan. 

 

In fact, what the witness said was that he could not state with certainty what the driver was trying to do.  And, of course, that would be rather hard to know exactly what the driver was trying to do.   

 

What Judge Munro fails to include in her discussion is the fact that during her testimony Susan stated very credibly that she believed that Shawn was trying to hit her.  Without that added point, you do not get the full flavor of the testimony in regard to that incident, i.e. that Susan was sincerely afraid for her life. 

 

In regard to DCF, Judge Munro repeatedly stated that when Susan called DCF, the department did not substantiate any abuse.  However, what I heard during court testimony is that Susan called DCF at one point because she was concerned that the children were not being  fed. 

 

When DCF visited Shawn Tittle's home they found the refridgerator in the kitchen was empty and the children stated that they were hungry. 

 

To me, these kinds of results indicate that calling DCF wasn't frivolous as Judge Munro would like to imply.  

 

Judge Munro also belittled the fact that Susan called DCF expressing concerns about the many guns Shawn owns.  Apparently, he owns 9 firearms, 6 of them handguns.  Of course, whether Shawn stored those guns safely or not as a rule, that is hard to determine.  The bottom line is that Susan had reported that Shawn had threatened her with them, and that  explains why she focused on them and expressed her concerns regarding the way in which Shawn handled the guns.

 

One thing I would say, particularly after Newtowne, is why would any man with young children hold onto a bunch of guns?  Haven't there been enough accidents with children and guns, let alone bloodbaths committed by minors at their schools with guns, for any sensible man to get rid of them?  Plus, how many guns are enough?  Do you really need nine?

 

Doesn't this alone call into question Shawn Tittle's capacity for good judgment?  

 

How many men have used guns to kill family members, particularly during a highly contentious divorce? 

 

Granting that, it seems to me that Susan's expressions of anxiety and distress regarding the guns was fully justified.  I feel a terrible sense of dread and foreboding just seeing a gun.  I could just imagine the distress Susan felt knowing her ex had a whole bunch of them. 

 

And talking about good judgment, how about the "isolated prejudgment incident regarding some hair pulling" that Judge Munro mentioned in her whitewashing comments in connection to Shawn Tittle's behavior.  Apparently, Shawn Tittle pulled his son's hair as a means of discipline.  I'm sorry, I would never pull a child's hair as a method of discipline.  That is entirely inappropriate. 

 

And don't tell me that it was a single incident.  A person who does this once, will do it again and again, or do something else very similar. 

 

What bothers me here is the pattern I see emerging in these kinds of Memoranda of Decision, in case after case where fit mothers lose custody of their children. 

 

Whatever the father does wrong is no big deal--mother is exaggerating and overreacting as a way to alienate the father from the children. 

 

However, whatever the mother does wrong is an overwhelming disgrace for which mother should be condemned and lose access to her children completely. 

 

For example, Judge Munro is highly indignant that Susan took the children out of school for two days in order to share some vacation time with them.  Of course, I'd get the indignation if the children were failing academically, but that isn't the case. 

 

I had a friend once who took her child out of school for a week on a trip to Mexico simply because that was when the timeshare was available.  No one thought that was a big deal.  The school simply gave the child a packet of assignments to complete while she was away.  So why does two days all of a sudden become a capital crime? 

 

Perhaps because Judge Munro was desperately seeking a justification for trashing Susan in order to deny her custody. 

 

The other thing Judge Munro does is condemn Susan because on occasion--maybe twice--she was very late picking her children up from school.  I don't know, I remember years ago, I was so exhausted that I fell asleep on a couch and ended up being late picking my son up from day camp.  So shoot me, why don't you. 

 

In the 29 pages of this Memorandum of Decision, Judge Munro only acknowledges in a single sentence that several witnesses spoke about what a great mother Susan Skipp is, "The defendant's better qualities as an active and attentive parent were detailed in their testimony." 

 

You know, you'd think that in a Memorandum of Decision written to determine which parent should have custody of the children that the judge would have a lot more to say on this topic.  

 

Further, in her testimony on the stand Susan was able to provide detailed information in regard to her role as a mother.  You could see her entire face light up with joy when she spoke of them. 

 

One of Susan's older daughters took the time to take the stand and speak in support of her mother.  This daughter had graduated from college and was leaving in a few days for England where she is going to study for a Master's Degree. 

 

I had the opportunity to speak to this young lady and she was a bright, personable, capable and independent woman.

Clearly, Susan's parenting counted for something.  Unless you are a judge like Judge Munro and your agenda is to take custody from a good mother like Susan Skipp in another one of Connecticut's famous custody switching schemes.  

 

More on this later... 

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