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Saturday, May 9, 2015

THE ILLUSION OF CHOICE IN CONNECTICUT FAMILY COURTS!

By Elizabeth A. Richter

I was watching a family court proceeding the other day.  There had been a hearing early in the morning and the parties were negotiating in the hallway.  Then, that afternoon the mother's attorney handed his client a copy of his proposed dissolution agreement and said "I want you to sign this agreement right now as is."  

When the mother expressed concern that there were parts of the agreement she didn't think were in her best interests, her attorney said, "As your attorney, it is my legal advice that you sign this agreement."  Waving to his associate and a friend who was sitting nearby, the attorney said, "I have two witnesses here who can testify that I told you that it is my legal opinion that you should sign this agreement.  If you refuse to sign it, you would be going against attorney's advice"  

Underlying this attorney's words, which in my view were very carefully chosen, was an outright threat to withdraw from the case and leave his client on the lurch.  

So what about this situation?  Can an attorney simply withdraw from a case and leave his client on the lurch, even when they are in the middle of a trial as was the case here?  

My experience is that yes, yes the attorney can do whatever he wants to do.  

Granted this situation where your own attorney can bully and blackmail you into an agreement you don't want, can you ever really say that family court litigants have free choice.  

I say no.

I wasn't always aware of this situation.  No less an attorney than Attorney Debra C. Ruel told me that no judge would allow an attorney to simply withdraw, particularly just before or during a trial.  She said that an attorney wishing to withdraw would have to simply grin and bear it because withdrawing is almost an impossibility.  Within two weeks of her remarks, my attorney had withdrawn with the complete blessing of the family court judge.  

In my experience with family court which is getting to be quite extensive, I have never yet seen an attorney denied a motion to withdraw for any reason.  No matter how ridiculous and obviously trumped up the reason, attorneys always seem to get away with a withdrawal from a case whenever they want to.  

So why the lies?  

I don't know; it seems to be part of the double talk that is fundamental to the profession of the law.  

Officially, the client is supposed to be making the decisions in his or her case.  See Rule of Professional Conduct for Attorneys No. 1.2 "Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer" which states "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."  

And further, "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter."  

The commentary on this section makes the interesting point that this rule "confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by the law and the lawyer's professional obligations."  Of course, this latter exception seems pretty broad! 

Then the commentary continues on to state that while a client may determine the goals of representation, it is the attorney who ordinarily establishes the means by which those goals will be achieved.  In short, "Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters."  

Further down the line, the commentary also includes the remark that "legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval."  

These guidelines appear pretty clearcut to me.  So how is it possible that with such firm guidelines placing the client in control of the direction of the representation, that the scenario I described earlier could occur, that an attorney could threaten a client to approve a dissolution agreement as is or else and force her to sign it despite her better judgment?  

What about my situation? I had a similar experience where Attorney James T. Flaherty presented me the parenting agreement in my case and told me to agree to it as is or else.  Later, Attorney Flaherty sat silently during the pre-trial on the custody, and when I asked him finally why he wasn't helping me, he stood up, stated he was going to withdraw from my case, and walked out.  And he got away with doing so without any expression of disapproval from the Judge--Judge Solomon--when this happened.

I'll tell you how this happens; it happens because there are so many loopholes built into other areas of attorney's legal ethics that it is laughably easy for any attorney to nullify completely the mandate conferring decision making authority on the client.  

I had three attorneys withdraw in my case, so let me take a look at the reasons they provided for their actions.  Here is the first one, "The movant seeks to withdraw from this case as client fails to cooperate with counsel, thereby rendering counsel's assistance ineffective."  

Fails to cooperate?  What the heck is that?  I see, fails to cooperate by signing this agreement "as is".  That's a pretty big failure in cooperation.  Failure to do what you are told would be rather uncooperative, don't you think?  

Here is another one, "Movant seeks to withdraw from this case as counsel because there has been a breakdown in the attorney/client relationship".  Yeah, because the client refuses to sign the agreement "as is" and do what he or she is told to do.  

These are grounds for withdrawal that one advocate friend of mine once said, "that are big enough to drive a mack truck through."  

For a better sense of how big the loopholes are allowing an attorney to basically withdraw at will from a case, take a look at the Rule of Professional Conduct for Attorneys No. 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation.  

Naturally, an attorney may withdraw from a case if a client wishes to use him to perpetrate fraud or a crime.  But more specific to this discussion is item (4) allowing an attorney to withdraw if "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement."  

So what if the lawyer finds it repugnant, as clearly the attorney in my initial example did, that his client won't sign an agreement "as is."  What then?  

This provision is closely allied to one in item (6) which states that a lawyer can withdraw if "the representation...has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client." Right, by not doing as the client has been told and signing the agreement, or else try Item (7) "other good cause for withdrawal exists", which I assume means anything else that an attorney can come up with.  

This latter item, by the way, is another example of why an attorney can stand in public in the open corridor and loudly threaten his client because, as we just read, there is absolutely nothing in the attorney's code of ethics to stop him.  

It is even more absurd to think that family court litigants have even a modicum of choice when you consider that they aren't even entitled to "informed consent" which is a fundamental component of decision making.  Again, when it comes to the concept of informed consent, the attorney's code of ethics gives it to their clients in one location, while taking it away in another.

Thus, according to the Rule of Professional Conduct No. 1.4 "A lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent...is required..."  Further, "This means the attorney should provide sufficient information to the client regarding the tactics the attorney intends to use and whatever information is necessary to understand what is going on."  

Item (b) of this rule specifically states again, "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."  Also, under "Explaining Matters" the rules state, "The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued..."  

And then here comes the loophole! 

The end of the sentence says, "...to the extent the client is willing and able to do so."  

Thus, if a client says anything vaguely like "I am not willing or able to listen or understand what you have to say at the moment." how often, or how long, is an attorney required to continue explaining?  Who is the one who is going to assess objectively the extent of a client's willingness and ability?

Isn't this additional phrase another great big opportunity for excuse making when an attorney bypasses the client by misrepresenting or not mentioning the facts essential to making an informed choice and then resolves a case contrary to the wishes of his client?  

And that is not the only area in the Rules of Professional Ethics for attorneys where clients are denied their right to informed consent.  Try a later commentary on this section entitled "withholding information" where it states, "In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication".  

So if your client might "imprudently" refuse to sign an agreement "as is" if he or she were aware of some vital fact, as an attorney, you would be allowed to delay telling your client about it until the agreement was signed.  Isn't this the meaning of that particular clarification?  Again, we have a loophole that is so big, it encompasses the entire Atlantic Ocean as far as I am concerned.  

What is interesting in regard to this part of the commentary on informed consent is that the text singles out people with mental health disabilities as an example, and describes them as not entitled to informed consent.  This written policy is a direct violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act as well as an outright denial of civil rights to people with mental health disabilities.

When you have rules of conduct which are effectively cancelled out later on in the text by extraordinarily large loopholes and/or extensively detailed exceptions, these rules are effectively, to all intents and purposes, eliminated.  

What this means is that the implementation of coercive tactics is a reality in Connecticut family court, particularly the coercive tactic of an attorney threatening to withdraw the day before, or even the day of trial unless the client writes up a substantial check on the spot.  

The coercive tactic of demanding a client sign an agreement based upon the threat that the attorney will withdraw, this is a daily occurrence in family court.  

Then, in the most hypocritical fashion ever, clients who have been bullied and coerced in public in the open hallway in front of friends, court employees, and any stranger that walked by at the time, have to undergo a procedure called the "canvas" where they swear under oath on the stand in open court that they were NOT coerced.  

Not only that, in such agreements there is normally an additional provision detailing the fact that the client was not coerced when, in fact, everyone, often including the judge, knows that the client was bullied all the way down the line.  

What this means, of course, is that the illusion of choice for family court litigants is just that--an illusion.  The bottom line is that the attorneys make the agreements; they do the negotiations.  Then they lie, bully, blackmail, or manipulate--whatever it takes--in order to get their clients to rubber stamp them.  Regrettably, based upon the wording of the current rules of professional conduct for attorneys in the State of Connecticut, family court litigants have absolutely no recourse when that happens.

PAS ONLY APPLIED TO ABUSED MOTHERS IN COURT!

Passed on by Patrice Lenowitz,

"Similarly, we know from our work that when people talk about alienation, they most commonly refer to mothers’ attempts to undermine the children’s relationship with fathers. Rarely do we hear people use the term alienation to describe a tactic that abusive fathers use to undermine the children’s relationship with mothers. Our experience tells us that alienation is a term most often used to counter allegations of abuse made by mothers – not to describe a tactic of abuse utilized by fathers." Battered Women's Justice Project

Friday, May 8, 2015

INVESTIGATIVE HEADLINE NEWS REPORTS: US DISTRICT COURT RULED CITIZEN JOURNALISTS HAVE SAME RIGHTS AS NEWS MEDIA!

January 20, 2014

Susanne Posel reported that,

"The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled last week that bloggers have the same 1st Amendment rights as established journalists when involved in a defamation of character suit; as long as the issue is of public concern.
The outcome of this case establishes the fact that protections afforded the news media are not exclusive to their realm, but are also extended to citizen journalists and bloggers.
The decision was entered because of a defamation lawsuit brought in Oregon concerning a blogger who had written online that this person had “criminally mis-handled a bankruptcy case”.
In this instance, the trustee was not a public figure; however it was ruled that this case is of public concern and the negligence standard was applied.
Two years ago, Crystal Cox, an “investigative blogger” was sued by Kevin Padrick for writing online that Padrick was guilty of “fraud, corruption, money-laundering and other illegal activities.”
US District Court Judge Marco Hernandez originally denied Cox the right of journalistic protection..."

For more on this important topic, please click on the link below:

http://www.occupycorporatism.com/us-district-court-citizen-journalists-rights-news-media/

Thursday, May 7, 2015

THE MARITAL AGREEMENT FROM HELL: THE COLLEEN KERWICK STORY, PART VI

I will grant the fundamental belief that Colleen Kerwick goes by, that in order for a child to be safe and healthy, he or she requires the positive involvement of both parents.  In situations where parents get along reasonably well and live closely to each other, it is possible to put together a very effective shared parenting plan.  This would be in the the best interests of the child in most circumstances.  

However, if an abusive parent simply uses the  close proximity to the other parent and the extensive access to the other parent that comes along with shared parenting, as a means to continue the abuse, the end result can be disastrous.  Unfortunately, this is what took place in the Savino v. Savino case.  

The shared parenting plan was in place from the beginning and then was memorialized in the Marital Settlement Agreement of March 25, 2013.  

I bring this agreement up because it is the mean spirited nature of this agreement that set up Colleen Kerwick to continue being embroiled in legal disputes well beyond its signing.  

In this agreement, the access schedule was established as follows:  the mother would have the child from after preschool Wednesday until Friday preschool in the morning.  Father was to have the child from every Monday at pickup from preschool until Wednesday morning at preschool.  Then each parent was scheduled to have the child every other weekend.  

I find this a pretty demanding schedule for a three year old child who has some physical challenges, and I would more have been interested in reducing the overnights until he was older.  

Both parents had joint physical custody, and when it came to legal custody, father was given final decision making authority. This makes absolutely no sense in the light of the fact that, according to Dr. Sidney Horowitz, Colleen was the more involved parent and father's judgment was in question given that he was in denial of his child's development delays and medical challenges.  

But just in general, even without those issues, in my opinion, giving one parent decision making authority to the exclusion of the other is the kiss of death.  It pretty much means that any time Colleen wanted to do anything important with her son, she was required to ask for her ex-husband's permission.  Aside from being a humiliating position to be in, sole decision making gives an abusive ex endless opportunities to cause trouble with that kind of power.

I asked Colleen why she agreed to it and she said that she simply didn't want to continue battling with her ex.  I understand that.  It is unfortunate when good people who would really prefer not to fight end up getting taken advantage of.        

Of course, this was not simply the consequence of trying not to fight; there was also a financial factor at play here.  Kenneth Savino had millions and millions of dollars at his disposal to continue the legal battle, while Colleen Kerwick only had the $220,000 she'd agreed to as a settlement in her prenuptial agreement.  This small sum of money which Colleen might have used to rebuild her life after the divorce pretty much ended up being consumed entirely by attorneys fees.  

The bottom line is that Colleen Kerwick wasn't street smart.  She'd had a very amicable divorce from her first husband of six years, and she assumed that she could count on fairness from her second husband--Kenneth Savino.  She had gone into the marriage believing that Mr. Savino was the person he presented himself to her as--a person of good character.  Thus, when she signed the prenuptial agreement, Colleen had not anticipated what would happen in an extended high conflict divorce, and had not ensured in that agreement or subsequent agreements that her ex would pay for her attorney's fees and related divorce costs.  I mean, why would she.  She wasn't out to take advantage of him.

Of course, this point exposes the fact that Kenneth Savino is high deceptive in his dealings.  In speaking to Dr. Sidney Horowitz during the evaluation, Mr. Savino stated, I will "pay her somewhere between $75,000 and $400,000" and this is "okay."  Well, no, that isn't true at all.  By the time Kenneth Savino was done Colleen had nothing and all Mr. Savino did was pay her attorneys.  He knew that at the time he made the remark because he was already scheming to drown her in legal maneuvers at the time he said it.

When it comes to child support, based on the agreement Colleen was allotted $465 per week which is considerably low given Kenneth Savino's resources and lifestyle. Then $65.00 of the child support was taken out to cover the cost of health insurance, which Mr. Savino was amazingly enough willing and able to obtain from the Connecticut HUSKY program, which is intended for people with low income, despite being so wealthy.  You can be sure Mr. Savino has a far better health plan than his son has.

I'm not sure why a businessman with such extensive resources would be interested in using among the most limited health plans in the state.  I mean, to me, that decision alone speaks volumes.  I am also somewhat puzzled because in these situations, it was my understanding that, according to the law, the child is supposed to live in reasonably equivalent circumstances when he goes from one household to the other.  How is he supposed to do that if Colleen Kerwick ends up with nothing, and Kenneth Savino gets everything?  

Further, it is quite striking that the Marital Agreement divides all expenses 50/50 down the line, disregarding Colleen's current low income, which was the result of having to stay in CT due to her extensive legal problems when her job is in New York.  In addition, all other expenses such as medical co-pays and extra-curriculars were also to be divided 50/50 between the parties.  Yes, Colleen is highly educated and there was no doubt she could build up her legal practice for the future.  However, it would have been only reasonable to provide a respite period to allow her to get on her feet before dumping so much of the financial responsibility upon her.  

So what we appear to have is an extremely stingy, punitive agreement put together by a legal team determined to pound Colleen to the ground on every level.  

Of particular interest in regard to this agreement, in terms of details, is the notation under provision 13.2 "International Travel" that "The Father shall hold the child's passport." and also another notation at k.ii indicating the "The Christmas vacation shall begin on December 22."  

The agreement requires that mother go to counseling and well as the father, but in provision n.vi I do note that mother will specifically lose access time if she shows evidence of any "alienating behaviors".  You knew that particular nugget would be directed at the mother and not the father!  There is no indication that any bad behavior on the part of father will result in a loss of access.  So the only person who bears any consequences here is the mother.  Talk about gross unfairness--here you have a fundamental example, one that is very typical in the father friendly State of Connecticut.  

I also have to say, I consider it a very unfortunate approach to punish the child for the sins of the mother.

Finally, there is also section 21 which indicates "A modification or waiver of any provisions of this Agreement shall be effective only if made in writing and executed with the same formality as this agreement."  A provision of this kind literally guarantees that the parties will return to court repeatedly.  When you are parenting young children, there are constant small emergencies where you have to change plans and head in a different direction.  

The car breaks down, forget your agreed upon meeting time.

The child vomits all over the back seat, forget your agreed upon meeting time.

The child wants to say a special good bye to the new friend he met in preschool and gets into a big conversation about dinosaurs while he is doing it, forget your agreed upon meeting time.

You are half way to the drop off point when you realize you left the child's medication on the kitchen table, forget your agreed upon meeting time.

I mean, what, are you going to go to court for each and every one of these instances?  Well, yes, if you are going to go strictly by a provision of this kind.  But if you have any kind of common sense, you will let it go.  Of course, if the provision is there so you can continue to persecute your ex-wife on an ongoing basis, then forget what I said.  In that case you have crafted just the Marital Agreement from Hell that you always wanted, and you can keep on wacking your ex with that legal stick as long as you want.  

To be continued...

HARTFORD COURANT REPORTS ON FREEWHEELING JUDICIAL MARSHAL ARRESTED FOR THE FORTH TIME!

Christine Dempsey of The Hartford Courant reports as follows:


"WATERBURY — A former judicial marshal who already faces child pornography and prostitution charges has now been accused of human trafficking, the state police said.

Michael Connelly, 53, of Sharon Road in Waterbury turned himself in about 6:15 a.m. Thursday at the Troop A barracks in Southbury on charges of trafficking in persons. He also was charged with three counts each of impersonating a police officer and coercion.

Connelly's lawyer, Leonard Connelly's lawyer, Leonard Crone, came out Crone, came out swinging during Connelly's arraignment Thursday afternoon In Waterbury Superior Court, calling the prosecution of Connelly a "sham," "weak" and a "vendetta played out" by state police and the chief state's attorney's office.

Crone said those agencies "had problems" with his brother, former Waterbury state's attorney John Connelly, and now law enforcement officials are "taking it out on him."

For more information on this important matter, please click on the links below:


Fourth arrest for human trafficking:
http://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-waterbury-connelly-judicial-marshal-arrest-0508-20150507-story.html

15 year history of causing trouble:
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-michael-connelly-judicial-marshal-work-problems-20150208-story.html#page=1

Wednesday, May 6, 2015

CT POST REPORT ON CONSERVATOR ABUSE!

October 25, 2014
Rob Ryser of the CT POST reported as follows

"Ideally, when 96-year-old Louis Russo had to leave his home temporarily, the probate judge would have appointed someone who understood his wishes and who wanted to carry them out.

Instead, under the care of a court-appointed conservator, the World War II veteran, who had always lived independently, was stripped of his rights, relegated to a nursing home and drained of his life savings.

Russo's friends and supporters are channeling their energy into getting him back into his New Fairfield house by Veterans Day. Meanwhile, their outrage has intensified calls for review, reform and legislation to ensure that there aren't more cases like his..."

For more on this case, click on the link below:




Tuesday, May 5, 2015

MICHAEL VOLPE OF "CRIME MAGAZINE" WEBSITE REPORTS BATTERED MOTHER LOSES CUSTODY TO ABUSIVE SPOUSE!

Independent Journalist Michael Volpe reports as follows:
"A battered mother lost custody of her kids to an abusive spouse after she refused to participate in court-ordered therapy with her ex-husband who had been convicted on nearly a dozen charges of sexually and physically assaulting her. 
Connecticut family court judge Maureen Murphy issued the shocking order on January 6, 2015, giving sole custody to violent offender Angelo Gizzi because his ex-wife Angela Gizzi (nee Hickman) refused to participate in "family reunification" therapy.
In 2007, Angelo Gizzi was charged with 13 criminal counts ranging from spousal abuse, spousal sexual assault, kidnapping, threatening, and risk of injury to a child.
When defendant Gizzi’s ex-wife -- who was severely traumatized from the domestic abuse -- was unable to testify against him because of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the state of Connecticut cut a plea deal for Gizzi to plead guilty to a series of misdemeanors, avoiding jail time.
Gizzi was initially given only supervised visitation with the couple’s two children, however several court professionals were assigned to the divorce including attorney William Brown as Guardian ad Litem to the Gizzi’s children, and Deborah Datz and Linda Smith as co-reunification therapists."