THE WATLEY DECISION, SC 18951/18952

Imagine how you would feel if the State came into your house and punished you by taking away your children not based upon anything that you had done, but simply based upon what you might do.  Sound like science fiction, perhaps on the level of the movie "Minority Report" starring Tom Cruise?  No, this was a reality for Connecticut couple, Joseph Watley and his partner, Karin Hasemann. 

This is their story.  Prior to meeting Joseph Watley, Karin had a daughter, Kristina, who was taken from her at birth in 2002 by DCF.  Then the couple had two children, Joseph born in 2005, and Daniel born in 2006.  Each of these children was taken from the parents by DCF based upon the concept that even though the parents hadn't done anything wrong to the children, they might do something wrong with the children--in other words based upon the doctrine of "predictive neglect." 

Using the holding of the Appellate Court as a standard, the Supreme Court defined the doctrine of predictive neglect as follows:  "The petitioner [DCF] in a neglect proceeding pursuant to CGS Sec. 46b-120 need not wait until a child is actually harmed before intervening to protect that child." 

And further, "This statute clearly contemplates a situation where harm could occur but has not actually occurred.  Our statutes clearly and explicitly recognize the state's authority to act before harm occurs to protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected and not just children whose welfare has been affected." 

And finally, the Supreme Court continues, "The doctrine of predictive neglect is grounded in the state's responsibility to avoid harm to the well-being of a child, not to repair it after a tragedy has occurred.  Thus a finding of neglect is not necessarily predicated on actual harm, but can exist when there is a potential risk of neglect." 

What is notable about this case is that from 2005 up until the present while this case has gone through the legal system, at each point the trial court has ruled to take the children from the parents, while the higher courts--the Appellate Court and now the Supreme Court--have consistently decided in favor of the parents.  So the higher courts, in this case, have continually had to correct the lower courts for improper rulings.  This leaves me with the impression that the trial court wants to do what it wants to do and simply disregards the law.

It also means that for the last 7 years this case has been cycling endlessly up and down the legal system leaving both the parents and their children in limbo, and denying them their right to a meaningful parent/child relationship.  At this point, the children have spent a significant part of their lives without their parents--Kristina is ten years old, Joseph is seven, and Daniel is six. 

This leaves most of us wondering whether creating this situation is intentional on the part of DCF, the judges, and the attorneys, that perhaps they are hoping the legal proceedings will continue up until the point that the children become independent or until the parents become so discouraged that they give up.  

Indeed, this is a classic case of "Justice delayed is justice denied."  

Furthermore, since 2008 Joseph and Karin have been denied the opportunity to see their children, ostensibly because their visits have been disruptive.  Naturally, they are disruptive since I can imagine these kids are wondering why they are not allowed to live with their own parents the way their friends do.  It is very likely that, if not now, definitely later, these children will require therapy in order to come to terms with the loss of their fundamental right to grow up with their own parents. 

What is interesting here is that DCF caused the problem, and then they go and blame the parents and punish the parents for it! 

So, why, I am sure you are asking, did DCF conclude that the parents could be a danger to their children?  Apparently, when Kristina was born Karin exhibited "strange behavior", and then when Joseph was born Karin then again exhibited "bizarre behavior".  There was no reported funny behavior with Daniel, perhaps because DCF grabbed him so quickly. 

Of course, all of this sounds like a lot of psychiatric name calling.  In other words, what does that mean strange and bizarre--in what way?  Raise your hands, ladies.  What with all the pain, and the drugs, how many of you exhibited either strange or bizarre behavior either before or after your babies were born?  I'll bet a whole lot of you.

Otherwise, what strikes me is that what Karin had sounds a lot like post partum psychosis.  I don't think there is any law in this country that justifies taking a child away from its mother on the basis of either post partum depression or psychosis. 

I once had a distant friend who had post partum depression and after her baby was born she tried to slit her throat (her own throat not the baby's!) with an electric carving knife.  She was hospitalized and had several ECT Treatments (not that I am advocating ECT by any means) and eventually recovered.  The last I saw of her she was sitting on a couch surrounded by her family and holding the baby in her arms. Nobody talked about taking the child away from her! 

The ruling also says that the mother has "a significant and long-standing mental health condition" and that "the father appeared to lack insight as to the mother's mental problems."  So what does that mean "mental health condition"?  As far as I know, particularly in the light of the constantly expanding DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) pretty much everyone has a mental health condition.  Seriously, why are the courts in this case so shy?  Why can't we get the name of this so-called mental health condition that Karin purportedly has.  Other courts in other cases aren't so shy. 

To be honest, I myself spoke at length with Karin Hasemann and she seemed just fine to me.  Maybe that is why Joseph Watley couldn't see it either.  But I have no patience with using ominous mental health labeling in order to damn other people.  My questions are: Can Karin take care of herself?  Can she get dressed, do her personal toiletry?  Can she hold a job?  Does she have housing? Does she have friends (well, apparently she has one in Joe) or family available to be supportive?  Can she drive a car?  Has she ever put another child not her own at risk?  Does she have any criminal record? If there are legitimate concerns about Karin's parenting, are there state agencies which could provide Karin with support and training in her home?  The latter would seem to me in accordance with the spirit of federal ADA law which the Supreme Court makes such short shrift of in its ruling. 

I mean, I know of retarded parents who are allowed to retain custody of their children, deaf parents of hearing children who retain custody of their children, parapalegics who retain custody of their children, alcoholics and drug abusers who retain custody of their children, even all sorts of parents with "mental health conditions" retain custody of their children--why pick on Joe and Karin? 

To be honest, if there is anything that seems to bother DCF more than anything else when it comes to these two, it is primarily their lack of compliance.  My guess is that if Karin and Joe had been a little more deferential, done what they were told, and played the game, they might, and I only say might, have had a better chance. Of course, I don't believe there is anything in DCF's mandate that states the agency has the authority to deprive citizens of their right to parent if they aren't obedient! 

The Supreme Court ruling states Joseph Watley was cited for not filling out required paperwork, failing to complete parenting education classes, and not setting up a parenting plan, along with not doing what he was told and not staying away from Mother.  What can I say, my X did the same things and he still ended up with joint custody. 

I would also like to point out a sentence tucked away between the condemnatory lines of this ruling which states about Joe Watley, "The court ackowledged...that during supervised visitations with Joseph before Daniel's birth, the father had been able to properly care for the child with some assistance and had demonstrated love and affection." Oh, really, love and affection.  And DCF thought that love and affection could be thrown away so easily and disregarded.  Please excuse me, if I am a little skeptical.

The Media has portrayed this Supreme Court ruling as a victory for parents with mental illness.  I do not see it that way.  First of all, I have to see it proved that either of these parents has a mental illness.  Apparently, the parents mental health was not a concern until DCF came upon the scene. 

Second, all the Supreme Court did was state that the lower courts had been incorrect in using the wrong standard of proof when they determined that the children were neglected under the doctrine of predictive neglect.  Apparently, the trial courts should not have used "fair preponderance of the evidence" as their standard; they were supposed to use the standard of "more likely than not." 

In its ruling the Supreme Court expressed absolutely no sensitivity towards the parents, not even a shred of regret, in regard to what it meant for Joe and Karin to have their children taken away from them in a series of arbitrary and captricious proceedings.  The Supreme Court completely failed to acknowledge the pain and hurt and public humiliation Joe and Karin  endured as a consequence of that fact that they were denied their constitutional right to parent. 

So I wouldn't be too happy about this ruling.  My guess is that this case will again return to trial court, the same evidence will be presented, and the trial court will state that the old evidence meets the new standard.  That determination will probably then go to the Appellate Court and maybe on up as high as Supreme Court again.  A few more years will go by, and Joseph Watley and Karin Hasemann will still be denied their right to parent to the detriment of their children and the extended family as a whole.  Again, for shame that our family courts operate tyranically and outside the bounds of the law and human decency.     

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES:

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2013/09/report-on-appellate-court-hearing-on.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2012/11/open-letter-regarding-watley-case-from.html

http://divorceinconnecticut.blogspot.com/2012/07/joe-watley-on-dangers-of-therapeutic.html

 

JOE WATLEY ON THE DANGERS OF THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE

LEGAL SEPARATION CONVERSION TO DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT, BUGGY V. BUGGY (2)

The procedure to convert a legal separation agreement into a dissolution agreement is governed by C.G.S. Sections 46b-65 and 46b-66 and Practice book Sections 25-36 and 25-37.

According to these statutes, a motion for a decree of dissolution after a legal separation may be filed at any time after the entry of a decree of legal separation and must state in the motion that the parties have not resumed marital relations.  Mignosa v. Mignosa, 25 Conn. App. 210, 214, 594 A.2d 15 (1991). 

Then, in order to grant such a decree dissolving and terminating the marriage, the court need only find that the parties have not resumed marital relations since the entry of the decree of legal separation. Schaefer v. Schaefer, 26 Conn. Sup. 224, 224-225, 217 A.2d 70 (1965).  So not only does the litigant have to state there are no marital relations, the trial court then has to confirm that the statement is, indeed, a fact.  First step one, then step two. 

So what does that mean "marital relations"?  I just looked it up in the English Dictionary online, and apparently it is a euphemistic term for sexual intercourse.  So the term marital relations is to be distinguished from marital relationship, the former just having to do with the sexual part of a marriage, while the latter having to do with the whole being in a relationship, having dinner together, sitting in the same house, chit chatting, etc. etc. 

I don't know about putting Memoranda of Decision online--I mean does everyone have to know this?  THEY AREN'T HAVING SEX ANYMORE, GUYS!  I can just imagine how this plays out in trial court.  First the plaintiff's motion on not having sex, then there is the defendant's response on not having sex.  Then you have testimony in trial court regarding not having sex, then the trial court's verbal determination that you are not having sex, and then you get the written one that you are not having sex. 

I mean, damn, if this happened to me, I wouldn't want to talk about sex for the rest of my life! 

But then, the whole decision gets onto the internet, and then your neighbors know you aren't having sex, folks on the pew next to you at Church know that you aren't having sex, pretty much the whole world knows you aren't having sex.  I mean, at least with your ex. 

What I want to know is if there have been situations--and I'm sure there have been--where the one party disputes the lack of marital relations and says, yes, we did too have funky, hot diggity dog marital relations under the dining room table two weeks ago and these are the details!  I can, seriously, imagine a full day of testimony trying to prove or disprove that. 

No, it was a makeout session--that doesn't really count. I let him kiss me once.  Ok, Ok, Ok.  Maybe twice, but just on the lips and there was no tongue involved.  

I did not have sex with that woman! 

It would be a pretty interesting day of testimony, as you can imagine!  More on that later. 

Anyway, in regard to converting a separation agreement into a dissolution agreement there is some disagreement as to how that is to be done .  On the one side, C.G.S. 46b-66 and considerable case law dictates that the court inquire into the financial resources and actual needs of the spouses before doing so.  In other words, "The fact that the agreement was presumably found fair and equitable at the time of the legal separation, does not excuse the failure of the court to make such determination (i.e. a determination regarding whether a legal separation agreement should be turned into a dissolution agreement without any kinds of changes) in the light of the situation of the parties at the time of the dissolution and to afford an opportunity for a hearing on the issues involved." Mignosa v. Mignosa, supra, 25 Conn. App. 215-216.

However, an earlier case Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Conn. 312, 481 A.2d 31 (1984)  disagrees, stating that the intention of the statutes in regard to legal separation is to reduce the role of the trial court when the parties on their way to dissolution have acknowledged that they have not resumed marital relations.  Under those circumstances, "the statute requires the court to give effect to the parties' status and convert a de facto dissolution into a de jure disolution."  In other words, change what is a matter of fact into a legal reality without making changes in the legal separation agreement and just incorporating it as is into the dissolution agreement. 


The reason why Mitchell v. Mitchell should have a greater impact in making a decision is because an earlier decision provides a better precedent. If you recall my earlier blog regarding the development of Common Law, you will remember how I said that Courts of Law are bound by precedent, meaning that cases are decided based upon what has been decided previously.  So Mitchell, as an earlier decision, is more significant than the later decisions that, for some reason or another deviated from it.

If the parties agree that there has been no resumption of marital relations, then the trial court would move forward with a summary process to dissolve the marriage.  However, if there was dispute over whether the parties had or had not resumed marital relations, then the parties could not proceed under the summary method and would have to move forward with ordinary dissolution proceedings. 

At question is not the issue of fairness and equity, but simply the question of did the parties or did they not have marital relations. 

If they did resume marital relations, then they would be required to continue forward with regular dissolution proceedings to determine whether the legal separation agreement is fair and equitable at the time of dissolution.  Thus, Gilbert v. Gilbert FA 04 0485657 (May 13, 2008) states, "The actual holding of Mitchell is that once the marital relations have resumed, the parties have vacated the decree of legal separation, and, therefore, in order to obtain a decree of dissolution, the parties must proceed under Sec. 46b-40." 

In other words, if marital relations were resumed, then the legal separation agreement can be changed.  And that is where, as I said previously, you could end up having very entertaining court hearings on whether marital relations did or did not resume.  Because if one or the other party doesn't like the legal separation agreement, making the case that you did resume marital relations could be quite beneficial. 

The central point to understand is in the following remarks from the holding in Gilbert v. Gilbert, "conversely, when there has been no resumption of marital relations and no intervening change in their relationship, the statute requires the court to convert the decree [of legal separation into one of dissolution].  To require a fresh look at the agreement when there has been no resumption of marital relations makes the decree of legal separation a nullity.  There would be no purpose in obtaining a legal separation.  Doing so fails to give any effect to General Statutes Sec. 46b-67(b) which provides:  'A decree of legal separation shall have the effect of a  decree dissolving the marriage except that neither party shall be free to marry.'

In other words, "If the parties' relationship is unchanged, the court plays a minor role and merely converts the de facto dissolution to a de jure dissolution."  Elaborating further, Bemonte v. Bemonte, 44 Conn. Sup. 431, 435-36, 693 A.2d 739 [16 Conn. L. Rptr. 336] (1995) states that in a situation where there has been no resumption of marital relations, "the judgment of legal separation, once the appeal period has expired, is final.   The division of assets and liability is also final.  An assignment of property is nonmodifiable." 

What this means to me is that, under circumstances where there is a legal separation agreement, and that agreement is a good one for you and you like it, and then the trial court tries to change it, you have considerable grounds to challenge such an attempt. 

In the Buggy case, after all this discussion, the trial court continued on to make changes in the financial agreement that was in the parties' legal separation agreement.  If the parties in the case had not agreed to allow these changes, granting the discussion I've just read, I seriously suspect that it would have been very tough on the trial court to have ordered those changes.  Has anyone had any experience here on this issue?  I would love to hear your comments.

DON'T GO DOWN INTO THE BASEMENT! DON'T GO DOWN INTO THE BASEMENT! BUGGY V. BUGGY! (1)

Have you ever watched a horror movie where people are being cut and chopped, sliced and diced, and then one of the few remaining characters hears a noise in the basement and says, "I'm going to go check and see what that noise is."  The music mounts dramatically, the basement door creaks open, and the heroine goes slowly step by step down the stairs waving a completely inadequate flashlight, and you the audience are screaming the whole time, "Don't go down there!  Don't go down there!"  But inevitably the lady goes down there gets her head chopped off or something like that, and you're like, "I knew it!"  Of course, we know it.

The same goes for getting a divorce from an abuser.  Every bone in our body tells you when you are filing for divorce from an abuser, don't do it, don't do it, but do we listen to ourselves?  No.  And then we get hit with the eternal lawsuit where our lives and reputations get dragged through the court, let alone the muck and mud, for years to come.

The ultimate wisdom is that you should never get a divorce from an abuser.  Now, of course, I know all you feminists are shrieking "How could you possibly say that!"  But see it from our perspective.  Before the divorce, we just have our abuser torturing and controlling us, but once the divorce has been filed, we now have the entire family court system, their mental health cronys, and DCF torturing and controlling us, so what do YOU think is best?  Right.  The answer is, "Don't go down there!" same way as any self respecting, smart character in a horror flick, if there are any, wouldn't go down into the basement like you told them to. 

This is pretty much what seems to be going on in Buggy v. Buggy.  The plaintiff, Sandra Buggy filed for a dissolution of marriage from the defendant, Glenn Buggy on July 1, 2005.   The Parties have two children J. born on August 23, 1997 and K. on April 6, 2000.  Then, on August 3, 2006 the plaintiff filed an amended complaint requesting a legal separation which was granted on August 11, 2006.  Their separation agreement was incorporated into the judgment of legal separation.  

Two years later, the Parties decided to go ahead with the dissolution of their marriage.  In preparation for the trial, which was held from June 7, 2010 to June 25, 2010, the Defendant, Glenn Buggy submitted a Motion for Modification proposing that he be given sole custody of the children and residential custody of the children.  In other words, Glenn Buggy wished to take custody from a good mother who had always been primary caretaker of the children.  Why?  You guessed it, Parental Alienation, again!

Multiple paragraphs of the motion to change the custody state variations on "The defendant's relationship with his children has been adversely affected by the actions of the plaintiff such that a transfer of custody from the plaintiff to the defendant is in the best interest of the minor children."  Right.  And who is involved in encouraging this change in custody?  You guessed it, our old friend Dr. Kenneth Robson! If you are not familiar with Dr. Robson, this is a custody evaluator who specializes in taking children away from their mothers making bogus diagnoses such as parental alienation. See "A Life Sentence" by Keith Harmon Snow at the following link:

http://www.consciousbeingalliance.com/2012/05/a-life-sentence-family-courts-sacrificing-mothers-and-children-in-america/ 

Then, Mr. Buggy also wished to reduce his financial obligations, including the amount of educational expenses he owed.  Now, I can understand wanting to cut back on child support and alimony, but money for your children's college education?  Money for your children's future success?  You want to cut back on that AND get custody.  Right.

So, can that be done?  At the time of dissolution, can you change the agreements made in a separation agreement?  In general, the answer would be "no", and sorting that question out could have been quite a challenge to the trial court in this case.  But again, in general, whatever might not be possible ordinarily can actually happen if you as the parties in the matter agree to it. 

And that is what took place in this particular case.  The parties agreed to allow modification of the separation agreement, or as the memo states, "Subsequently, on June 10, the parties agreed that the following provisions of the separation agreement were modifiable:  Article II (custody and visitation), Article III (unallocated alimony and child support) except 3.10 (debt of $78,450.46 owed by the defendant to the plaintiff), 3.11 (amount of $2,000 borrowed from the minor children's account by the defendant) and 3.12 (payment of 1/2 of the moving expenses of the plaintiff by the defendant)  The parties further agreed that Articles IV, VIII through XVIII were nonmodifiable.  Article V was not mentioned."  Article V had to do with college expenses. 

Now, as I am reading through the list, I'm like shame on you Mr. Buggy for "borrowing" from the minor children's account.  How many times do you I have to hear about so called borrowing from children's accounts during a divorce.  That is a shame and a disgrace, I don't care how small the amount is.  Don't take things from your kids, please.

Furthermore, Mr. Buggy complained that there had been a "significant decrease in his earning" which meant that he could not meet the financial obligations he had agreed to.  Seriously, folks, there should be a law about either party deliberately reducing their income just around the time of divorce and complaining they have no money.  I'd like to see a statistical analysis of how many litigants do this because I hear it so, so often. What is it about divorce that leads the more financially responsible party to become suddenly brain dead and unemployable?  Beats me!

Clearly, just reviewing the Memorandum of Decision in the Buggy case, the question of changing the separation agreement is the source of considerable legal head scratching and convoluted reasoning.  

The bottom line is that it was not in Sandra Buggy's interest for the the separation agreement to be changed.  Were it me I would have fought that question out before the trial court and made it as hard as possible to change the separation agreement.  Instead, Ms. Buggy agreed, which saved the trial court considerable trouble because it could then shift responsibility off their shoulders and say, "Well, she agreed to change the separation agreement to a stipulation." 

That's where I would say, were it me, or were I Ms. Buggy's attorney, I'd have been saying, "Don't go down into the basement!" 

Of course, maybe there is something I don't know, but I see this happening, how many times?  Often.  I've been told by my attorney, the court, or someone, go and sign this stipulation, which, as it turns out, will cause me nothing but harm.  Then the trial court justifies the harm by saying, "But you agreed to it." which is what the judge in the Buggy decision did at the end of the discussion. 

Trust me, if you feel uncomfortable, if it doesn't feel right, if you see everyone in the room all prepared to break out into happy grins, don't sign it.  Think it over.  Put off the decision for another day.  Do anything, but don't go down there! 

To be continued. . . 

BAUER V. BAUER, FA 97 071559 SINGING KUMBAYA, AND THE BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (5)

Continued from part 4

Remember how we used to act during the old demonstrations of the 60s and 70s?  We'd wave the posters, chant "The people, united, will never be defeated", raise our fists, applaud all the speaches and have a high old time?  Then everyone joined hands, sang kumbaya and then we'd be good for another day. 

Something kind of similar happens in a Connecticut Divorce.  The attorney's rip each of you apart, and bludgeon your kids; they give you the devil's handshake, and then we are all supposed to stand in a circle and sing Kumbaya!  No seriously.  You're laughing.  I know you are laughing.  Stop it.  Ok. 

Of course, there is a little bit of a problem with that, particularly in this case, $400,000 later.  You are right.

Judge Bishop acknowledged that at the end of his Memorandum of Decision.  He states, "Attorney Santy [the GAL] is commended for his commitment to Gregory..."  Damn I would be committed too for the amount of money he got!  "At an early stage in the litigation, defendant's counsel (Attorney Eliot Nerenberg) instructed Attorney Santy not to communicate ex parte with Mrs. Bauer.  Based on my observations during trial, I believe that this prevention of direct, unhampered communication between Attorney Santy and Mrs. Bauer had a chilling and polarizing effect." 

Oh, Eliot how could you!  I am so disappointed.  It would never occur to me that you had such an appetite for filthy lucre that you would allow a chilling and polarizing atmosphere to develop thus costing the parties considerably more legal fees, particularly fees owed to you.   

Apparently, Judge Bishop concedes that, according to the Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2 in the CT Practice Book, Eliot was well within his rights to act as he did.  However, what Judge Bishop acknowledges, and quite crucially so, is that "Rules adopted for the handling of traditional civil and criminal litigation may not have an equal applicability to family litigation where counsel have a special responsibility to 'spike the forensic guns' and to foster an environment in which the parties are enabled to come to voluntary resolution of their intra-family dispute." Jackson v. Jackson, 2 Conn. App. 179. 

Golly gee.  Why didn't anyone tell me about this.  Spike the forensic guns!  So they have a special responsibility, do they!  I hope they take that very seriously.  Yeah, right.  So, that is not all.  There is more. 

Judge Bishop continues on to say, "The Rules of Professional Conduct may not adequately cover the role of counsel in family dispute resolution.  In 1991, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers published standards of conduct for attorneys involved in family matters" called the "Bounds of Advocacy".  They provided a revision of this standard in 1995.  Judge Bishop says, "While neither of these standards is binding, both are instructive and relevant. 

According to Judge Bishop, The Preliminary Statement in the Bounds of Advocacy states, in part:  "Existing codes often do not provide adequate guidance to the matrimonial lawyer.  First, their emphasis on zealous representation of individual clients in criminal and some civil cases is not always appropriate in family law matters."  

Bishop continues on with his quotation, "In many ways, matrimonial practice is unique.  Family disputes occur in a volatile and emotional atmosphere.  It is difficult for matrimonial lawyers to represent the interests of their clients without addressing the interests of other family members.  Unlike most other concluded disputes in which the parties may harbour substantial animosity without practical effect, the parties to matrimonial disputes may be required to interact for years to come.  In addition, many matrimonial lawyers believe themselves obligated to consider the best interests of children, regardless of which family member they represent." 

So, if the professional standards for Attorneys published by the American Academy of Matrimonial lawyers is so important, and attorney's should abide by them, how come they are not in the Connecticut Practice Book or mentioned somewhere, somehow.  I mean, I have been in my divorce for years and years and I never even heard of these standards. 

That hurts.  I mean.  Didn't anyone want to include me so I'd know what I could reasonably expect from my attorney?  I'm crying now.  My hanky is wet!  One moment.  Let me blow.............Ok, now.  Feeling better.  So, let me see.

Rule 2.15 of the "Bounds of Advocacy", "An attorney should encourage the settlement of marital disputes through negotiation, mediation, or arbitration."  Oh, and here is another lovely one: 

Rule 2.6, "When representing an unimpaired child, counsel should take appropriate measures to protect the child from harm that may be incurred as a result of the litigation by striving to expedite the proceedings and encouraging settlement in order to reduce trauma that can be caused by the litigation." 

And I assume that "encouraging settlement" means more than just expecting me to give away all my rights while the other side gets all the rights.  Underlying the concept of "settlement" is the concept of mutual concessions, I would think. 

How come there is all this good stuff in cases reported by the court, like here, but I've never seen these ideas promoted anywhere else, like in my own case or that of any of my friends, who have been victimized by horrible, multiyear, NPD driven divorces.  Do attorneys ever really read those professional ethics, or are they too busy scooping up the dough and running to the bank? 

I am seriously thinking of grievance.  No, maybe a lovely Motion to Sanction.  Yes, that's right...

For more information regarding the professional ethics of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers as stated in their publication "Bounds of Advocacy", see the link below:

http://www.willicklawgroup.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Bounds-of-Advocacy,-1991-ed..pdf

IN CUSTODY DISPUTES, PSYCHIATRY USED AS A TOOL OF THE STATE AGAINST ITS CITIZENS: LISTEN TO THE STORY OF DR. ROBERT FETTGATHER

http://innersites.com/janet/f2f-phalen-fettgather.mp3

BAUER V. BAUER, FA 97 0715559, HE'S BAD. THAT'S RIGHT! HE'S BAD. (4)

(Continued from Part 3)

It must have been really fun for Gregory to spend his time with Dad sitting around playing video games, going to movies and things like that, once Dad retired and was much more available.  

As I have said before, previously, for the first eleven years of Gregory's life, his Dad was away in New York for the week and only returned home on weekends.  And I assume that some of that time on weekends was spent simply traveling back and forth and, I am assuming, Dad's mind must have been quite preoccupied with work for some of the time.  It is hard to leave work behind.  

Then in 1997, Dad retires and he is totally available.  That must have been quite a change and led to lots of changes in both Gregory and Mr. Bauer's life, including the fact that both would have had the time to get to know each other better and develop a closer relationship.  

So, what kind of man was Mr. Charles I. Bauer.  Who was this man that Gregory was poised to develop a closer relationship to?

Luckily for you and me, since the trial court is transparent, and on the basis of the principle of transparency will spread all your private information out on the internet for everyone to see, we have all sorts of detail about Mr. Bauer.  

Not so of Mrs. Bauer. You realize that there was a psychological evaluation of Mrs. Bauer as well as Mr. Bauer so this practice of broadcasting all this information about the character of the parties should have affected both of them.  However, surprise surprise, there is no commentary of any real interest regarding Mrs. Bauer.  I would guess that everyone figured it wouldn't make sense to kill the golden goose who is laying the big fat golden eggs.  We want to keep her profile neat and tidy so she can keep up with her employment and pay all the bills.  

So Mrs. Bauer is looking really, really good, but Mr. Bauer?  

I have to shake my head.  Reading all this information on Mr. Bauer, he looks like a total scumbag.  

But first off, let's see how many doctors had a shot at examining this guy.  First, Dr. James C. Black in the custody evaluation, then there is Dr. Allan M. Jacobs, a psychiatrist specializing in substance abuse, Dr. Frank Stoll, to do the psychological evaluation, and then the neurological evaluation with Dr. Edward Fredericks.  Alrighty then, do we have enough cooks?!?  

So what do they say about our guy?  

He is anti-social, "Mr. Bauer leads a sendentary life in his retirement.  He has no apparent involvement in the community life of Simsbury."  

He is an alcoholic but denies it, "Until his use of alcohol became an issue in this dispute, he was a daily drinker, consuming beer occasionally at lunch, martinis in the evening, and wine periodically with dinner."  

Then he has a history of seizures, so he shouldn't be drinking, but he does anyway, "Though the number of seizures is disputed by the parties, it appears to the court that Mr. Bauer has had at least three convulsive episodes in his life time, each one associated with alcoholic intake."  Mr. Bauer knows his drinking upsets his son, Gregory, but does he stop?  No.  

Then, on top of the alcohol, Mr. Bauer "also smokes approximately a pack of cigarettes daily against medical advice." and, as a result, is in the early stages of emphysema.  When asked if he smokes in front of his son, he denied it.  According to the trial court, "While Mr. Bauer testified that he smokes in the bathroom upstairs and the fumes don't leave the bathroom, the court takes this claim as no more than a schoolboy's fantasy that evidence of smoking can be kept from the unwary."  

Then to top everything off, Dr. Stoll's evaluation of Mr. Bauer found that "this man lacks much insight into himself and others", that he is "disinclined to admit any social shortcomings", and that his personality structure has "a strong narcissistic component."  

As a final remark, Dr. Stoll says, "following Mrs. Bauer's relocation to Minnesota Mr. Bauer has assumed the primary responsibility for Gregory's care.  It has not gone well." Or as the trial court put it, describing that period, "Indeed, it is evident that Gregory was failing amidst Mr. Bauer's inattention and ignorance."

So what does Dr. James C. Black, the custody evaluator think of all this?  He asserts that despite Mr. Bauer's self-destructive behavior "that Mr. Bauer has been a positive role model for Gregory." which leads me to wonder:  Was Dr. Black smoking something very special himself?  I mean, did he pay attention to any of this information about Mr. Bauer's drinking, smoking, seizure inducing, child neglecting, narcissistic behavior, or was he snoozing through all of that?  

In regard to Dr. Black's testimony that Mr. Bauer is A-OK, for once, thank God, "The court disagrees."  It is not every day that the trial court disagrees with stupid, but this time it did.  And God bless the trial court for doing so.  

Of course, this testimony about Mr. Bauer could all be invented.  As we know, people do invent in family court.  And if any of us were scrutinized at length by four separate mental health professionals, I don't know how well any one of us would do.  

The bottom line is that the trial court's decision was the Mother would have custody if she would return to Connecticut and live in Simsbury and allow Gregory to finish high school there.  More than anything else, this decision is testimony to the power of a fifteen year old on a trial court's determinations.  Keep this in mind when you consider what is going on with you in family court.

This would give Mother around two months to find a new job in Connecticut, which isn't very much time for an upper level corporate executive.

Ultimately, also, the trial court gave no alimony to Mr. Bauer even though Mrs. Bauer made double the salary that he did.  So, if Mr Bauer's motivation for fighting for custody for Gregory was money, he was not going to get it.  And if Mrs. Bauer wanted custody of the child she said she loved, she would have to give up a considerable amount of her money, her salary, in order to have it.

Truly, a Solomonic conclusion to a very costly trial court proceeding.  

Tell me, what do you think, if the roles had been reversed and Mr. Bauer was the  one with the fancy job, and Mrs. Bauer was the drinker and smoker, would Mr. Bauer have been challenged to give up his job?  I wonder?

And there is more...

BAUER V. BAUER, FA 97 0715559, THE CHILD (3)

The most difficult part of my divorce was the custody issue.  This is where I did everything I possibly could to protect the children from the battle that was going on in trial court. 

When my X and I exchanged the children for visitation, I did whatever I could to remain polite and to establish a reasonably friendly and civilized atmosphere.  I can remember grinding my teeth to keep my mouth shut so I wouldn't say anything that would later be a problem. 

Today I had a conversation with my older daughter.  She said to me, I am now beginning to understand what an unusual childhood I have had.  My heart leapt to my mouth as I wondered what she meant, thinking she was about to share some divorce trauma with me.  Instead, she said "You always took us to the library so that I have read many more books than most people my age." 

I felt so relieved.  If that is all that she remembers as being unusual about her childhood, I will have achieved my goal of protecting her from the dangerous fallout from my divorce.  I then laughed and said, "Well, that was actually you, because when I took you to the library, it never occurred to you to say 'I don't want to go.'" 

Unfortunately, for Patricia Bauer, in her case, she didn't have the same luck. 

When she told her son, Gregory, we are now moving to Minneapolis, he said "No, I don't want to go.  I want to stay in Simsbury with my Dad!" 

My position had always been in regard to my children that they will do as they are told because I am the mother.  However, when family court involves itself in your lives, that kind of firm control goes overboard as the court allows the kids to use the GAL against you, the attorneys in the case fabricate false information about you, and then undermine your authority. 

Can any of you relate to that?  I think you can. 

This is very problematic for a mother and I have heard stories about this from many of them.  I think it is very hard to shift from having full authority to having most of the authority shift from Mother to all these other people from family court who really have no idea what is going on the way a Mother does. 

This is tough enough when the children are young and need the kind of firm hand a Mother can provide, but what do you do, what will the family court do when these children begin to verge upon the age of decision making?  What do you do when the children reach 13, 14, 15 years old?  How much do you listen to the views of children that age? 

Now Charles and Patricia Bauer spent around $400,000, as you know, fighting over the custody of their son.  The young man involved in this case, Gregory, at the time around 15 years old, met with a psychologist, Dr. Wilbur Nelson, who stated that Gregory had "the requisite intelligence to have an informed preference concerning his living circumstances." 

My best bet is that at age 15, the trial court is going to conclude this about any child.  So, if you have a 15 year old child who is stating a preference for any particular living arrangement, do not spend $400,000 fighting that because, trust me, the conclusion is foregone. 

You know you are out of luck if the trial court assigns an Attorney of the Minor Child to the child rather than a GAL as they did in the Bauer case.  That is one great big hint to you that whatever the child wants, he or she will get. 

It may be still rather iffy at 13 or 14, but at 15, you have lost before you even begin if you try to go against the wishes of the  child.  When I tell this to parents, they always argue with me.  They can't seem to believe it is true.  It is amazing how many so called adults find it hard to understand that little Johnny, little Johnette, is all grown up and responsible for his or her actions, including taking action with AMCs and GALs and the trial court which are harming such parents profoundly. 

Regretably speaking, for such litigants, I can only say, the sooner they figure this concept out, the better.  Because until they do, they will simply be banging their heads against a brick wall.  And I've seen people bang their heads against this particular wall for a considerably long period of time and all that does is cost time, money, and heart ache for no damn good reason, as the Bauer case goes to show.  Kids are kids and they can be heartless, not unloving, but heartless.

So, aren't you glad you read this blog, because now you know, now you know not to go wasting your money with a great big custody battle when the results are preordained as everyone involved in this $400,000 court case already knew even as they engaged in it.  Isn't it true that the parties are the last to know about these things? 

Actually, in this particular case, it wasn't so much the child's age that made the difference. I think where both parents lost their authority to make any determination in regard to Gregory was when the trial court found out that Gregory had "attended seven schools in nine years." as he was growing up. That's nuts, totally nuts! 

Sometimes before you go embarking on some big family court case, it makes sense to have some therapy to explore your motivations so you don't use family court as an extremely expensive means to work out your own mental health issues.  Just reading over this case, listening to the reports that all Gregory wanted was for his parents to stop fighting over him, I can only say this was a really, really sad situation--"What Maisy Knew" reprised.

BAUER V. BAUER, FA 97 0715559: AN UNUSUAL MARRIAGE (2)

One of my bad habits in life is that I keep on falling in love with men who are considerably older than me.  I am not sure why that has happened.  Daddy problems, maybe, or maybe I am an older person trapped in a young person's body! 

And, I was going to say, of course, but maybe I shouldn't make out it is a matter of course, in the end these relationships sucked because men like this were already married or life experience had jaded them too much to appreciate me.  So it is with some sense of the unfortunate that I figured out that between Mr. Bauer and Mrs. Bauer there is a solid twelve years, he being the older. 

On the other hand, there were twenty five years between Humphrey Bogart and Laren Bacall, and that relationship seems to have worked out.  Although, when I think of it, in the final years of their marriage, Lauren was winking over Bogie's shoulder at Frank Sinatra, that old devil.  Honestly, you think old blue eyes could stay out of it and leave our illusions intact! 

Not only were there twelve years between the Bauers, the marriage was a third for Mr. Bauer and a second one for Mrs. Bauer.  Ouch!  Theirs was a dance of closeness and distance, mostly distance, and one that is fairly complicated to the point where I had to draw myself a diagram in order to be sure I had the facts correctly.  I will now convey them to you and if you get lost, well, you are only in the same position that the rest of us are at.  Here goes. 

The couple met in Michigan in 1970s, dated and lived together for four years.  Then in 1974 Mrs. Bauer moved to Washington, D.C. and stayed there for six years until she got back together with Mr. Bauer in 1980, moving to Avon, CT and living with Mr. Bauer in a home on 177 High Road.

Then in 1981 Mr. Bauer got a job in New York City and purchased a condominium in New Jersey where he stayed during the week while returning to Avon to be with Mrs. Bauer on weekends. 

Got it!  This is where I started to get lost! 

Anyway, in 1982, the couple got married, and in 1983, their only son, Gregory, was born.  From 1981 until 1994, approximately 13 years, Mr. Bauer maintained this situation of living in New Jersey and visiting with Mrs. Bauer and his son in Avon, CT for weekends, meaning the arrangement was in place for the first eleven years of Gregory's life.  In other words, Mr. Bauer was daddy for the weekend for a considerable period of Gregory's life.

Then from 1994 to 1997, Mr. Bauer moved to stay in Avon, CT full time, working for his New York City company from an office in the home.  Then in 1997, he retired, having arrived at the age of 65--keep in mind that leaves Mrs. Bauer at 53 with twelve more years of productive working life. 

Can you imagine having a guy visiting in your home on weekends, then all of a sudden he is in your house 24 hours a day 7 days a week?  And what does Mr. Bauer do with all that free time?  Sits around on his butt playing video games with his son! That would drive me nuts! 

So, surprise, surprise, in 1997 Mrs. Bauer is discharged from her job based upon conflicts with her boss and gets a job in the far distant wilds of Minnesota, one of those vaguely interchangeable boxlike states located in the great midwestern wasteland of America, where she proceeds to make a considerable amount of money, and I am talking serious money. 

The couple have an understanding that Mr. Bauer and Gregory will follow once Mrs. Bauer finds a house in Minnesota and the old house is sold.  As it turns out, once Mrs. Bauer put her money down on a house in Minnesota and the old house was sold, Mr. Bauer suddenly decides enough is enough and files for divorce and for residential custody of Gregoy.  Men.  This is the time he decides to be a bum.

So the war begins... 

CHARLES I. BAUER V. PATRICIA S. BAUER, FA 97-0715559 (1), WAR OF WILLS

To start with, in this case I am not going to get right into the players or the story; I'm just going to go straight to the money issue.  Because money has to be one of the primary themes of the case.  


As it turns out, this is the story of a fairly non traditional couple who kind of break the mold in many ways.  However, in the way they divorced they didn't break the mold; instead, they walked down the path of high conflict divorce which we are all so familiar with.  


They walked it to the point where Judge Bishop stated, "This case is a war of wills cloaked in a custody dispute.  The battle consumed eleven trial days, and the parties have incurred approximately three hundred and seventeen ($317,000) thousand dollars of legal fees and attendant litigation costs."  


Ok, I am jumping right to the end of this case where there is a more detailed discussion of the fees.  It looks as though plaintiff  (father) was represented by two attorney's serving as co-counsel at trial which added up to $193,302, the Defendant's (mother) attorney cost $92,516, and then the counsel for the minor child submitted a bill for around $32,000 which does add up to the $317,000 the judge was talking about regarding legal fees.  


Ok, I love this kind of addition and subtraction.  I guess Judge Bishop was willing to be open about the legal fees but he was not willing to itemize the so called attendant litigations costs, over and above the base $317,000.  


This consisted of the costs for the custody evaluation by Dr. James C. Black, which was probably around an additional ten thousand or more, then the cost for the psychological evaluations, another five thousand or more, then the cost for the substance abuse evaluator and the neurologist, several thousand more, and then over and above that, according to Judge Bishop, "Each of these medical and mental health professionals provided a report to the court.  Several of them testified as well."  


Ok, then, the cost of the expert testimony alone was extremely expensive, no doubt.  That's four expert witnesses, and who knows how many days of testimony they had to come in for.  Plus, there must have been some fun depositions, don't you think!  Depositions of the expert witnesses, and also depositions of the parties!  Just one great big fun time!


So, what do you say, guys, with legal fees, attendant court costs, costs of transcripts, costs of travel for Mrs. Bauer, what do we have--around maybe $400,000 as a reasonable estimate for the entire divorce.  Wow!  Lots of people made a killing here!  


Judge Bishop seems to be pretty amazed by all this money going around, but I'm sure you the reader and I am not that surprised.  Seriously, I must have spent the same amount on my divorce and others I've spoken to have easily gone to a million or more.  


I can recall my first attorney when he saw an investment account statement of some stock which I was using to pay his fees; he sat there with the statement in his hands this gloating look on his face like, yes, this will all be mine, and it was within a few short months.  The greed I saw play itself out in my divorce was extraordinary.  


Thousands and thousands of dollars, a small fortune, gone, all gone.  My future, my children's future, all in the hands of attorneys.  And the judge in this case actually takes the time to question that?  I am amazed.  Where has he been as a judge in Connecticut? In la la land? 


I've been reading a book called "Aftertime" by Sophie Littlefield about a post apocalyptic world where Zombies roam the streets looking for living people to eat.  This is how the author describes the bloodlust of these zombies, 


"The maniacal frenzy of their hunger could not be tempered by any obstacle. They'd run across glass, across hot coals, across this terrible scorched earth that was the end of the world if it meant fresh, uninfected flesh.  They were body eaters, after all, and that was all they lived for."  


If you replace the word "flesh" with money, the word "body eaters" with money suckers, you'd have most lawyers, that's for sure.  Maniacal, insane, crazy for profit, no matter how much damage they do, no matter how many lives they destroy, men, women, children, it's all the same to them, to lawyers.  


More in Part II....

DR. RUDOLF BEE'S NIGHTMARE DIVORCE!

As I continue to investigate the issue of corruption in CT Family Court, I occasionally come across stories that are totally tragic. 

These are stories of divorces that continue over a period of years, sometimes up to a decade or more while eating up litigants' entire resources, all of their savings, their real estate, their investments--literally everything they have, leaving people destroyed both financially and emotionally. Much of this is the result of attorney misconduct and judicial abuse.

Below is a link to a divorce case that caused untold damage to one individual--Dr. Rudolf Bee.  Clearly, this case started to go wrong in so many ways right from the beginning.  It leaves us pondering such questions as: 

1)  What recourse does the family court system and/or the State of Connecticut have in place for divorces that are clearly out of control and destroying the lives of the people involved in it? 

2)  Also, what role do attorneys and judges play in creating these situations and don't legal professionals have a responsibility to take preventative measures to make sure this kind of harm and damage does not take place? 

3)  Isn't the legal profession in family court a form of organized crime the way attorneys fix cases, and drain litigants of multiple thousands of dollars?

Keep in mind that in Connecticut, a quarter million is nothing in terms of what litigants such as Dr. Rudolf Bee lost--think of the millions squandered in the Tauk divorce!

Isn't it time to put a stop to this corruption?  

Click on the link below, review the case and tell me what you think!

http://www.kangarootrial.com/

Published on The Connecticut Mirror (http://www.ctmirror.org)

Home > A judicial confirmation hearing goes off script

---

A judicial confirmation hearing goes off script

Mark Pazniokas

February 22, 2012

The Malloy administration prepped Maureen M. Murphy for her judicial confirmation hearing Wednesday with questions about her sexual orientation and the pivotal role she played in the legalization of gay marriage in Connecticut.
But the legislature's Judiciary Committee endorsed her nomination to the Superior Court on a 31-9 vote without a single comment or question about her advocacy of gay rights or the landmark litigation that led to same-sex marriage.
Perhaps they were too distracted.

Maureen M. Murphy preparing to testify.

Controversy came from another quarter, unrelated to issues of sexual orientation or questions of judicial activism: Murphy was accused of bias in her court-appointed role as guardian in a bitter custody case won by the father of an 8-year-old boy.
The accusations came from Ada O. Shaw, a friend of the boy's mother, and Keith Harmon Snow, a self-described "independent war correspondent" and "genocide investigator" who says he is writing about the custody case. The testimony of a third witness, Michael Nowacki, who calls himself a "private attorney general," concluded with his arrest by Capitol police.
Murphy, 61, one of six lawyers nominated last month by Gov. Dannel P. Malloy, sat with her wife, her 90-year-old mother and friends. By the end, she wore the expression of a theater patron who had wandered into the wrong show.
Her appearance before the committee began with Sen. John A. Kissel of Enfield, the ranking Republican, offering praise for an eclectic career.
"You strike me as a person with a lot of neat life experiences, a lot of dedication to those in need," Kissel said. "I think you'd be terrific on the bench -- a lot of wisdom, a lot of humility and a lot of compassion and a lot of smarts."
After college, Murphy was a programmer and research assistant at the Rand Corp. She volunteered with disabled children in New Mexico and in Connecticut, then received a master's degree in special education. She became a lawyer relatively late, at age 35.
Murphy worked for the attorney general's office, representing the state Department of Children and Families in special-education hearings and state universities in civil litigation. As a private lawyer, her practice included the representation of gay, lesbian and transgender clients in family and discrimination cases.
She was a founding member of Love Makes a Family, the gay rights group, and a member of the legal team that brought a lawsuit that yielded the state Supreme Court's 4-3 decision legalizing same-sex marriage in 2008.
In the past five years, Murphy took on more cases as a court-appointed guardian ad litem, a lawyer responsible for watching the child's interests in custody and other family law cases.
Custody cases are notorious for yielding complaints against judges by the losing party, said Kissel and Rep. Gerald Fox, D-Stamford, the co-chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
Sen. Paul R. Doyle, D-Wethersfield, told Murphy that the committee was in receipt of letters from two people questioning her actions in a custody case, Doe vs. Roe.
One was from Shaw, the other from Eli Newberger, a pediatrician hired by the mother. Both complained that Murphy was hostile to the mother, deferential to the father and ignored evidence of physical and sexual abuse.
Murphy said she was limited in what she could say about the case. She acknowledged testifying, which she said happens in only about 5 percent of custody cases.
"If it gets to that point, there is usually one parent who is extremely unhappy," Murphy said. "And the more complicated the case, the more likely that one parent feels you have been wrong."
Murphy said her testimony was one element of the record on which a Superior Court judge made her custody decision.
In the telling of Shaw and Snow, the West Haven police, DCF, Murphy and a Superior Court judge all ignored evidence that the boy was being abused.
"Maureen Murphy did absolutely nothing," Shaw said.
"The mother has been accused of all kinds of psychological disorders," Snow testified, but he found her credible. "It's easy to tell who is telling the truth."
Legislators struggled with the testimony, saying the witnesses seemed to be suggesting a conspiracy involving Murphy, the police, DCF and a judge.
Shaw said she could not explain why the police took no action in the case, other than a referral to DCF. She said the only action by the child-protection agency was to accuse the mother of "educational neglect."
The third witness was Nowacki, whose grievances had less to do with Murphy than the Judiciary Committee's policies and the court system's approach to family law. He was arrested by Capitol police after refusing to surrender the microphone after his allotted time.
Nowacki, 58, of New Canaan was charged with interference with the General Assembly.
Legislators struggled with the testimony of Shaw and Snow, saying the witnesses seemed to be suggesting a conspiracy involving Murphy, the police, DCF and a judge.
Rep. John Hetherington of New Canaan, the ranking House Republican member of the committee, asked to delay a vote on Murphy's nomination to allow more time to examine the record. Without more time, he warned that some members would vote against confirmation.
"I've never voted no on a judicial nomination. It is not my desire to vote no on this nominee," he said.
Rep. Arthur J. O'Neill, R-Southbury, said if public hearings are to mean anything, the committee must look further into the allegations against Murphy.
The committee rejected a postponement, 21-16.
The full House of Representatives could vote on Murphy's confirmation as early as Thursday.

---

Source URL: http://www.ctmirror.org/story/15528/arrest-and-unexpected-accusations-judicial-confirmation

I WOULD LOVE TO HEAR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS ARTICLE!  USE COMMENT SECTION BELOW!  ALSO, TAKE THE TIME TO COMMENT ON THE ORIGINAL WEBSITE, SEE LINK ABOVE!